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ABSTRACT
In the first chapter, I estimate structural equilibrium models that identify the 
degree of overlap in products and services, and hence competition, between com-
munity banks and large credit unions in 1,771 local US financial services markets. 
Large credit unions offer some of the products and services as community banks, 
leading many to question if federal tax exemptions are needed to facilitate the 
provision of such goods. My results suggest that large credit unions do not dis-
place community banks, suggesting that they primarily serve different customer 
bases with different types of products. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the 
overlap in product and services between community banks and large credit unions 
reduces the number of community banks by only 2.5 percent. In addition, the 
results indicate that the presence of large credit unions lead to 13.5 percent more 
institutions, suggesting that they facilitate variety in products and services.
In the second chapter, I investigate if non-binding fee caps can be used as 
focal points by payday lenders to facilitate tacit collusion in 1,978 local markets 
in the United States. The results show that, after controlling for local demand and 
cost characteristics, sufficiently high fee caps can increase payday lender entry 
and profitability relative to lenders in markets without fee caps. The evidence 
suggests that the use of non-binding fee caps can be an effective tool for tacit 
collusion.
ii
In the third chapter, I investigate the relationship between interest rate swaps
and growth in mortgage lending by US credit unions from 2011 to 2017. I exploit
a rule change by the National Credit Union Association in 2014, which allowed
certain credit unions access to financial derivatives, to identify this effect using
a difference-in-differences approach. I find that credit unions using interest rate
swaps experience greater growth in mortgage lending, where growth in fixed-
rate mortgage lending is most significant, than credit unions that do not use these
financial instruments.
iii
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CHAPTER 1
CAN COMMUNITY BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS COEXIST?
EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL FINANCIAL SERVICES MARKETS
1.1 Introduction
Credit unions’ common bond structure and tax exemption status allow them to of-
fer loans and deposits at appealing rates to retail-oriented customers. Over the last
two decades, the average credit union has evolved from offering only automobile
loans and depository services to also supplying loans more in line with banks such
as real estate and commercial loans. Coupled with credit unions’ growth in size
and tax exemption status, community banks — banks with less than $1 billion of
assets who also rely on retail-oriented business — argue that the current competi-
tive playing field in the market is unfair.1 The ability of credit unions to use their
tax exempt status to undercut banks on rates and use their size as an advantage
against traditional financial services firms is leading many to consider if they have
a significant impact on the financial services market.
The growing similarities between credit unions and community banks has
led to policy discussion surrounding the merits of the federal tax exemption. After
the passing of the Tax Cuts and Job Act of 2017, policymakers discussed remov-
1“Consolidation within the credit union industry has created credit unions far larger than many
of the community banks they compete against, thus providing credit unions a double advantagethey
are much bigger than many of their taxpaying competitors, yet pay no federal income taxes.”
American Bankers Association (2013)
1
ing the credit union tax exemption in order to offset the costs of the bill. The
tax exempt status of credit unions is a significant cost to the US treasury, as it
was estimated to have cost $2.9 billion in terms of lost income for the fiscal year
2016 (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2017). Policymakers’ main justification for
this proposal was the growing similarities in products and services between credit
unions and banks.2 As stated by the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, the mission
of credit unions in the United States is to facilitate the provision of credit to con-
sumers outside the traditional banking industry. Critics contend that credit unions
have abandoned this mission and now operate as tax-exempt banks, thus deserv-
ing the same policy treatment as traditional financial services firms.3 However,
credit unions assert that, while their asset size has grown, their traditional focus
on consumer loans and member accounts still remains.4 As the tax exemption is
a significant cost to the treasury and a sensitive issue for community bankers, it is
likely that policymakers will revisit the issue in the future.
The assertion that the federal tax exemption gives unfair cost advantages to
credit unions is dependent on the premise that their products and services are sub-
stitutes to those offered by community banks, leading to credit unions displacing
community banks in markets. Although studies in the literature find that banks and
credit unions compete on deposits and automobile loans (e.g., Feinberg (2001) and
2”Many of the larger credit unions operate in the same manner as banks. These activities
include purchasing previously for-profit banks and buying the naming rights to sports stadiums.”
U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (2018)
3“Many credit unions are now indistinguishable from banks, yet they still pay no federal in-
come taxes. The credit unions tax exemption gives them a distinct advantage when they compete
directly with banks, especially smaller banks.” American Bankers Association (2016)
4See https://www.pscu.org/membership/credit-union-difference/ (Accessed April 13th, 2018)
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Hannan (2002)), the literature lacks empirical evidence that credit unions signifi-
cantly impact the entry, and thus profitability, of community banks. In this study,
I estimate discrete models of entry and product choice to address this relationship.
Since product-specific data are unavailable for many of the services offered by
credit unions and banks, models that use the presence of a firm to encapsulate the
total competitive effect provide a more useful and practical approach. These mod-
els capture the intrinsic endogeneity in the ordered entry decisions of the firms.
As a result, I can predict in counterfactual analyses how market structure would
change if the competitive pressure of credit unions was eliminated.
My study relates to previous work in the literature in three ways. First, it
contributes to the understanding of how credit unions interact and compete with
other financial services firms. Since market-level data on interest rates and profits
are difficult to obtain in the financial services industry, few studies on the compet-
itive relationship between banks and credit unions exist. Feinberg (2001) finds a
negative relationship between credit union market share and new vehicle and unse-
cured loan rates. Hannan (2002) finds a positive relationship between credit union
market presence and money market, checking, and certificate of deposit rates.
Tokle and Tokle (2000) find that higher competition from credit unions increases
banks deposit interest rates. Emmons and Schmid (2000) find that households
respond to bank concentration by shifting accounts to credit unions. While these
studies provide partial evidence of competition for particular financial products,
my endogenous entry model allows me to more comprehensively measure how
the profitability and viability of different types of institutions are impacted by the
3
presence of competition. Differences between own and other type competitive ef-
fects allows for me to determine if large credit unions and community banks offer
products and service that are strong or weak substitutes. Hence, my contribution
focuses on the overall competitive impact of credit unions on community banks.
Second, my study contributes to the literature on competition and product
differentiation between non-profit or not for profit firms in the context of entry.
Harrison and Seim (2017) investigate the crowd-out effect of different tax treat-
ment of non-profit gyms on for-profit entry. They find that non-profit and for-profit
gyms serve different consumer groups. Ballou (2008) determines that asymmetric
competitive effects between ownership types such that the absence of a nonprofit
nursing home increases the for-profits entry probability, but not the other way
around. Cohen et al. (2013) produce evidence that crowd-out effects between
government substance abuse clinics and for-profit and nonprofit clinics are more
significant than between the for-profit and the nonprofit. My study compliments
the findings of these studies by providing additional evidence that tax-exempt not-
for-profits and for-profits can coexist in markets.
Last, my study follows other applications of entry models to the financial
service industry. Cetorelli (2002) uses an endogenous entry model similar to that
of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) to analyze the competitive conduct of conventional
banks in the financial services markets. He finds that conventional banks may be-
have competitively after the third entrant. Using an endogenous entry model with
product differentiation, Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) find that multi-market, savings
and loans, and single-market banks are not perfect strategic substitutes for one
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another. Their results imply that banking markets can exist with multiple types
of firms. Coelho et al. (2013) model the entry decision of private banks with the
presence of public banks in the Brazilian banking market. They find that pub-
lic banks have an economically insignificant impact on the competitive conduct
of private banks. Feinberg (2008) uses an entry model similar to Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) to determine the competitive effect of entry in credit union markets.
My study extends these results by including credit unions in the endogenous entry
model of traditional financial services firms. My results indicate that differentia-
tion may allow for credit union and traditional financial services firms to operate
in the same geographies.
Although my study lacks market-level data on variable profits, prices, and
costs, the competitive presence of credit unions on bank entry can be identified
using techniques from the industrial organization literature. The empirical analy-
sis focuses on the entry decisions of community banks and large credit unions as
theory suggests they have similar production technologies and descriptive statis-
tics show they may overlap in certain product and services. A structural model
of endogenous entry, which allows for firms of different types and is robust to
equilibrium assumptions (Cleeren and Verboven, 2010), estimates the parameters
of firms’ objective functions for a cross-section of 1,771 local financial services
markets in 2010 and 2015. This approach allows for the identification of the im-
pact of a firm of a given type, and thus the aggregate effect of all their products
and services, on each type of firm’s entry decision. Competitive parameters in the
model allow me to assess the degree to which the two compete and the likelihood
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that community banks and large credit unions can coexist. Locations of banks
and credit unions come from the FDIC Summary of Deposits and the NCUA
Credit Union Branch Information Report. Maximum likelihood estimation pro-
duces estimates of parameters that identify the effect of demand and competitive
characteristics on entry.
Basic entry models do not accommodate for the event when either firm
would prefer to enter if the other one did not (e.g., Schaumans and Verboven
(2008) and Gayle and Luo (2015)). I follow Cleeren and Verboven (2010) by
including an order of entry assumption that chooses community banks entry when
equilibria where either could enter are produced. Additionally, I obtain estimates
from a cross-section from a different period to ensure the robustness of the results
to the dynamic assumptions of the model. Finally, counterfactuals are used to
determine the extent to which competition from large credit unions impact the
entry of community banks.
The results of my study suggest that it would take eight to ten large credit
unions to have the same impact as a rival community bank on community bank
entry. These competitive effects reveal that the products and services of commu-
nity banks and large credit unions do not overlap in markets that are important
to the profitability of community banks. Moreover, entry decisions appear to by
driven by different factors. Credit union entry responds primarily to population,
while community bank entry is driven by the demand for housing and the num-
ber of businesses and farms. Current institutional features such as regulation and
market strategy may limit large credit unions from competing more directly with
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community banks. Coupled with these results, large credit unions’ cost advantage
may not substantially affect community bank profitability.
My results are robust to assumptions of the order of entry, market dynamics,
and market definitions. Since competition between community banks and large
credit unions is not substantial, estimates of the competitive effects from models
that accommodate for the multiplicity problem are not significantly different from
the basic entry model. In addition, insignificant differences in estimated com-
petitive effects for markets in the years 2010 and 2015 suggest that institutional
changes in the market have not affected community banks ability to differentiate
their services from those offered by large credit unions. Last, the results are robust
to the assumption of market definition, as estimates from selected rural markets
are similar to the those produced from the total sample.
Counterfactual analysis supports the claim that large credit unions have a
economically negligible impact on the profitability of community banks. Using
estimates from the entry model for markets in 2015, I simulate a scenario where
community banks and large credit unions do not compete. Under this condition,
the total number of community banks rises by only 2.2 percent, suggesting that
competition from large credit unions does not have an substantial impact on com-
munity bank entry. In addition, the simulation implies that the presence of large
credit unions leads to 13.5 percent more financial institutions in the sample mar-
kets, implying that large credit unions’ focus on retail-oriented business and their
existence may lead to a greater variety in products and services in the market.
My study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents relevant background in-
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formation about the local financial services industry and the role of community
banks and large credit unions in the sector. I then present in Section 3 an empir-
ical equilibrium model of entry by ownership type. Section 4 outlines the data
that I use to estimate the parameters of the model. I then turn to the results of my
estimation in Section 5. I conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of my results
and the potential policy implications.
1.2 Industry background
According to the US Treasury, a credit union is differentiated from other finan-
cial services firms through five characteristics (U.S. Treasury, 1997). First, credit
unions are member-owned, member-directed depository institutions. Credit unions
do not issue capital stock. Rather, they derive their net worth from their accumu-
lated retained earnings. Second, credit unions rely on unpaid, volunteer boards
of directors elected by, and drawn from, each credit unions membership. Third,
credit unions do not operate for profit. Fourth, credit unions have a public pur-
pose. Last, credit unions have certain limitations on their membership, limitations
generally based on a common bond among members.
In 1998, the US Congress passed the Credit Union Membership Access
Act, allowing for credit unions to have multiple common bonds with their cus-
tomers. Following the successful passing of this act, the asset size of credit unions
grew larger, as the total assets in the credit union industry swelled from $294 bil-
lion in 1998 to 1.25 trillion in 2017, despite the number of credit unions falling
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from 12,201 to 5,689.5 At the same time, the financial portfolio of credit unions
changed dramatically, as the total amount of real estate loans expanded from
roughly $50 to $500 billion, outpacing the growth in automobile loans, which
grew from roughly $75 to $350 billion. As the scale of production size of credit
union grows, they are likely to continue to diversify their portfolio, as Goddard et
al. (2008) find evidence that, concerning portfolio diversification, the positive di-
rect exposure effect outweighs the adverse indirect exposure effect only for credit
unions of the most substantial size.
During roughly the same period, the community banking industry experi-
enced a dramatic change. From 1990 to 2016, the number of community banks
declined from 11,858 to 4,507 (Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis, 2016). Of the
community banks operating in 1984, 25 percent exited through merger, while 59
percent consolidated and 8 percent failed by 2011 (FDIC, 2011). Moreover, total
assets held by community banks remained stagnant, about $2 trillion, while large
banks saw their total assets rise from $2 to $12 trillion (FDIC, 2011). Recently, the
issues faced by community banks has featured prominently in policy discussion.6
The growth in size and changes in products and services of credit unions
may have greater implications for community banks than for other traditional
financial services firms. Similarities in production technology may lead credit
unions to offer products traditionally provided by community banks. In particu-
5Unless specified otherwise, loan statistics are derived from the NCUA and FDIC call report
database.
6E.g., the 2016 Council of Economics Advisers Issue Brief “The performance of community
banking over time”.
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lar, both firms may find themselves competing in markets where local knowledge
is important. Anecdotal evidence suggests that community banks benefit from
“relationship lending”. Close relationships with customers may give community
banks a greater ability to gauge the creditworthiness of local borrowers than fi-
nancial services firms with larger production scale, which is particularly relevant
to issuing commercial loans (e.g., Berger and Udell (1995)). Community banks
often rely on this advantage in competing with larger banks, as Marsh and Sen-
gupta (2017) find that community banks respond to large bank entry by obtaining
more assets into markets where relationship lending is essential. Indeed, the com-
position of community bank assets reflects the importance of local loans as real
estate and commercial loans represented roughly 20 and 18 percent of total loans
in 2014.
Similarly, credit unions may benefit from “relationship lending”. Con-
sumers must be members before a financial transaction can occur at a credit union.
By interacting with members frequently, credit unions may be able to gauge po-
tential borrowers in a similar manner to community banks. In addition, credit
unions and community banks may provide a relatively similar customer service
experience. Of small businesses sampled in 2016, 78 percent reported satisfaction
with credit union services, compared to 80 percent of small banks and 61 percent
with large banks (New York Federal Reserve Bank, 2016).
However, limitations in technology of smaller credit unions, regulation, and
organization strategy of credit unions may lead to them offering different products
and services than community banks. Smaller credit unions often rely on volun-
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teer workers to manage deposits and issue loans. These volunteers may not have
the expertise to offer anything other than consumer loans (Goddard et al., 2008).
Indeed, in 2014, new and used automobile loans constituted roughly half of the
total loans of credit unions with assets less than $100 million. Current regulation
limits the extent of products credit unions can provide. For example, regulations
currently exist that limit credit unions to placing 12.5 percent of total assets to
business loans. In 2014, approximately 1000 credit unions were near or close to
this cap (NCUA, 2014). Although real estate loans constituted roughly half of
total loans of credit unions with assets greater than $100 million in 2014, they
still had a substantial presence in new and used automobile loans. Of these credit
unions at the, new and used automobile loans represented roughly 30 percent of
total loans. In comparison, automobile loans accounted for only 4.9 percent of to-
tal bank loans in 2010 (FDIC, 2010). Although credit unions are getting larger, it
appears they have not abandoned their traditional role as providers of automobile
loans.
1.3 A model of endogenous entry with product differentiation
In the spirit of Cleeren and Verboven (2010), to examine the competitive effect
of large credit unions in local financial services markets I employ a three-stage
model of oligopoly market entry under product differentiation in the context of
the local financial services market. In this setting, discrete choices (e.g., enter or
dont enter a given market) are arrived at by calculating the profitability of the po-
tential alternatives. In this case, entry occurs until the characteristics of a market’s
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demand and cost characteristics lead to no profitable, or positive value producing,
entry by a firms of each type, producing a equilibrium market configuration.
1.3.1 Structure of objective functions
Assume a market m with a total of N potential participants, divided into NCB
community banks and NLCU large credit unions. Participants play a three period
game, where the first period firms are endowed with a type, the second period
firms sequentially choose to enter or not to enter, and the third period firms com-
pete. Entry decision by firms of type τ are predicated on maximizing the objec-
tive function Πτ , which is influenced by the nature of demand and competitive
characteristics in a market. While I assume the community bank’s objective is
to maximize profits, following the non-profit entry literature (e.g., Harrison and
Seim (2017), Rennhoff and Owens (2012), and Gayle et al. (2012) I assume that
large credit union’s objective is to maximize welfare of the community. To avoid
confusion, I use value to describe the output of the objective function for the max-
imization problem. I specify the reduced form objective function of a firm of type
τ in market m as
Πτ,m = piτ,m(Xm, NCB,m, NLCU,m)+ετ,m = Xmβτ+g(θτ ;NCB,m, NLCU,m)+ετ,m.
(1.1)
Market specific shifters are contained in Xm and βτ represents the effect of mar-
ket shifters on firm τ ’s value. The g(θτ ;NCB,m, NLCU,m) portion of the objective
function represents the effect of competitors on value. Parameters in g(θτ ;NCB,m, NLCU,m)
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can differentiate between the impacts on value of same-type firms and the com-
petitive effects of firms of the different type. I specify the set of parameters to
capture the incremental effects of additional firms of each type. Observe that the
parameter vector differs across types. This specification potentially permits the
competitive effects to differ by type. I allow the competitive effects of the same
type of firm to impact value non-linearly and the competitive effects of the differ-
ent type to affect value linearly. This specification results in
g(θCB;NCB,m, NLCU,m) = θCB,LCUNLCU,m +
4∑
i=1
θCBi1(NCB,m ≥ i) (1.2)
for community banks and
g(θLCU ;NCB,m, NLCU,m) = θLCU,CBNCB,m +
1∑
i=1
θLCUi1(NLCU,m ≥ i) (1.3)
for large credit unions. Note that the effects of same type competitors on value
for community banks and large credit unions are truncated at four and one, re-
spectively. This truncation is due to the restrictions on the maximum number of
community banks and large credit unions to five and two respectively in order
to facilitate estimation. I tried estimating the model with up to six community
banks and three large credit unions and found that I did not have enough useful
observations to identify the estimates. In addition, following previous studies of
endogenous entry (e.g., Mazzeo (2002), Schaumans and Verboven (2008)and Co-
hen and Mazzeo (2007)) I assume that the unobserved portion of value ετ,m is
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drawn from an independent standard bivariate normal distribution.7
1.3.2 Equilibrium concepts
The unobserved part of value relates to the observed number of firms by a set of
equilibrium assumptions. Omitting the market subscript, a firm of type τ chooses
to enter if it earns non-negative value Πτ (X, NCB, NLCU) in a given market, given
the local characteristics of demand and competition from incumbents. Alterna-
tively, if a firm receives negative value upon entry, it chooses to stay out of the mar-
ket and earns zero value. In equilibrium, firms enter a market until the next entrant
earns negative value, given the market’s demand and competitive characteristics.
Omitting the market subscript, the equilibrium conditions describing an optimal
firm-configuration of community banks and large credit unions (N∗CB, N
∗
LCU) are
piCB(X, N
∗
CB, N
∗
LCU) + εCB ≥ 0 > piCB(X, N∗CB + 1, N∗LCU) + εCB, (1.4a)
piLCU(X, N
∗
CB, N
∗
LCU)+εLCU ≥ 0 > piLCU(X, N∗CB, N∗LCU+1)+εLCU . (1.4b)
Moreover, I assume that firms of a type are substitutes for the other type
and are better substitutes for firms of the same type than firms of a different type.
For an equilibrium market configuration (N∗CB, N
∗
LCU) these assumptions result
7Although it is possible to allow for correlated unobserved values in the derivation of the
likelihood, I determined that the correlation can not be empirically identified given the variation
in my data and restrict it to zero for all models.
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in
piCB(X, N
∗
CB, N
∗
LCU) + εCB ≥ piCB(X, N∗CB, N∗LCU + 1) + εCB, (1.5a)
piCB(X, N
∗
CB, N
∗
LCU) + εCB > piCB(X, N
∗
CB + 1, N
∗
LCU − 1) + εCB (1.5b)
and
piLCU(X, N
∗
CB, N
∗
LCU) + εLCU ≥ piLCU(X, N∗CB + 1, N∗LCU) + εLCU , (1.6a)
piLCU(X, N
∗
CB, N
∗
LCU)+εLCU > piLCU(X, N
∗
CB−1, N∗LCU +1)+εLCU . (1.6b)
Since the observed market configuration is the equilibrium product of repeated in-
teraction between firms, it is consistent with a long run equilibrium. This assumes
that my observations resemble a long-run equilibrium across my cross-section of
markets. To test the model’s sensitivity to this assumption, I compare parameter
estimates derived from observations in two distinct periods.
1.3.3 Multiplicity problem
In an ideal setting, the entry model would predict a unique equilibrium market
configuration given the characteristics of the market. For sufficiently large or
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small realizations of the unobserved portion of value εCB and εLCU , the model
could predict a unique market configuration in equilibrium.8 However, if firms
entry decisions are endogenous to entry decisions of firms of a different type,
the conditions above will not produce a unique equilibrium (Berry, 1992). In
particular, insufficiently large or small realizations of the unobserved portions of
value εCB and εLCU can lead to the model predicting multiple equilibrium.
Figure 1 displays the problem in a straightforward game with one potential
entrant for each type. The vertical lines indicate when the community bank can
earn non-negative value upon entry, given that the large credit union also enters,
(1,1), or given that the large credit union does not enter, (1,0). The horizontal
lines are similar value lines for the large credit union, given the community banks
entry decision. For low realizations draws of εCB and εLCU , the unique Nash
equilibrium is (1,1), both firms enter. Alternatively, for large realizations draws of
εCB and εLCU the unique Nash equilibrium is (0,0). Market configurations (1,0) or
(0,1) may also be obtained as unique Nash equilibria for a range of draws of εCB
and εLCU (the upper left and bottom right areas). However, for medial draws of
εCB and εLCU the market configurations (1,0) or (0,1) are both Nash equilibria, the
middle square. In other words, for these draws there is a coordination problem,
and either the community bank or large credit union enters the market. If the
multiplicity problem is present in the market, portions of the likelihood function
that represents market configurations with multiple equilibria will not be defined.9
8See Cleeren and Verboven (2010) for proof.
9See Collard-Wexler (2007)
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Cleeren and Verboveen (2010) show that, for the general case, the area of
multiplicity for a Nash Equilibrium (N∗CB, N
∗
LCU) is the area that overlaps with
the Nash equilibria (N∗CB + 1, N
∗
LCU − 1) and (N∗CB − 1, N∗LCU + 1). The area of
multiplicity for (N∗CB + 1, N
∗
LCU − 1) is
piCB(X, N
∗
CB + 1, N
∗
LCU − 1) ≥ εCB > piCB(X, N∗CB + 1, N∗LCU), (1.7a)
piLCU(X, N
∗
CB, N
∗
LCU) ≥ εLCU > piLCU(X, N∗CB + 1, N∗LCU). (1.7b)
To address the potential outcome of multiple equilibria, I put additional
structure on the entry game by assuming that firms enter sequentially. Mazzeo
(2002) controls for the multiplicity problem by assuming the most profitable firm
enters over the other firm. However, if in reality, entry is not sequential, the most
profitable firm may not enter over the less profitable firm. Since entry of commu-
nity banks predate entry of large credit unions, this approach may not be suitable
for the financial service industry.10 Following Cleeren and Verboven (2010), I as-
sume that community banks enter the market first, meaning that in cases of mul-
tiplicity, community banks enter over large credit unions.11 While I could use an
equilibrium selection rule similar to Berry (1992) and Jia (2008), the results in the
next section show that estimated parameters are stable under different equilibrium
assumptions.
10For a history of community banks in the US see Kahn et al. (2003).
11In Section 5, I examine the sensitivity of the results to this assumption.
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Assuming that community banks enter first, (N∗CB, N
∗
LCU) is the unique
sub-game perfect equilibrium if the unobserved portions of value εCB and εLCU
satisfy the equilibrium conditions defined in equations 4a-6b. However, the po-
sition of εCB and εLCU violate the previous conditions if they overlap with the
equilibrium that results in more community banks, as defined by the area of mul-
tiplicity with (N∗CB + 1, N
∗
LCU − 1) specified in equations 7a-b. Hence, the prob-
ability of observing a market configuration (N∗CB, N
∗
LCU) as the unique sub-game
perfect equilibrium outcome is
Prob(NCB, NLCU) =
∫ piCB(X,NCB ,NLCU )
piCB(X,NCB+1,NLCU )
∫ piLCU (X,NCB ,NLCU )
piLCU (X,NCB ,NLCU+1)
φ(uCB, uLCU)duCBduLCU
−
∫ piCB(X,NCB+1,NLCU−1)
piCB(X,NCB+1,NLCU )
∫ piLCU (X,NCB ,NLCU )
piLCU (X,NCB+1,NLCU )
φ(uCB, uLCU)duCBduLCU ,
(1.8)
where φ is the standardized bivariate normal density function with correlation
parameter equal to zero. Note that the first and second terms in Equation 8 relate
to the equilibrium condition described in Equations 4a-b and Equations 7a-b. Also
observe that the second term in Equation 8 is equal to zero if community banks
and large credit unions have no direct effect on each others objective functions.
In this setting, only the first term exists, and the model reduces to a bivariate
ordered probit model. I use maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of
the objective function parameters that maximize the probability of the observed
market configurations across the sample.
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1.4 Data
The following sub-sections document the data sources, characteristics of banks
and credit unions, and description and definition of financial services markets. I
follow Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) in constructing the market definition and includ-
ing demand characteristics which shift the demand for financial services market. I
deviate from Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) in that I define the institutions in the sam-
ple markets as community banks, large banks, and large and small credit unions
rather than single-market, multi-market, and thrift banks.
1.4.1 Data sources
The data are based on a cross-section for 2010 and 2015 and are from several
sources. Federally insured bank and credit union locations are derived from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) summary of deposits and the Na-
tional Credit Union Association (NCUA) branch locations data, respectively. Bank
and credit union asset characteristics come from the FDIC and the NCUA balance
sheet and income statement information (call report) for the fourth quarter of 2010
and 2015. Demographic variables are from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Given the format of the data, there are many potential units of aggregation.
Although the literature generally defines a banking market by Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Area (MSA) (e.g., Dick (2007)), political boundaries of a MSA may not
reflect economic characteristics. Following Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) I define a
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banking market as a Labor Market Area (LMA). The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics defines a LMA as an economically integrated geographic region within which
individuals can reside and find employment within a reasonable distance or can
readily change employment without changing their residence.
To identify the parameters of the model, units of observations must in-
clude distinct markets. I eliminate urban and large rural markets from the sample
markets (markets with population sizes less than or equal to 100,000 inhabitants)
which are likely to have more than one distinct markets. As a result, the sample is
composed of 1,771 small, rural markets. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for
profit shifters in these markets.
1.4.2 Definitions of banks and credit unions
I define the unit of entrant as the presence of a uniquely owned bank or credit
union. Banks or credit unions with two or more branches are treated similarly to
those with one branch. Since participants are unlikely to add additional branches
that diminish their profitability in a market, including the count of branches would
likely underestimate the competitive effects of entry.
Following the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, I define a
community banks as a bank with less than $1 billion 2015 USD (United States
Dollars) in assets.12 Also, I define large banks as banks with assets greater than
or equal to $1 billion 2015 USD in assets. Following the NCUA, I define large
12The Federal Reserve Board and Government Accountability Office defines community banks
as banks with less than $10 billion in assets.
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credit unions as credit unions with assets greater than or equal to $100 million
2015 USD. Moreover, I define small credit unions as credit unions with asset less
than $100 million 2015 USD. During the period in the sample, no credit unions or
banks changed classifications. Table 1 shows that from 2010 to 2015, community
bank, large credit union, and small credit union entry grew modestly while large
bank entry declined. When I truncate the number of community banks and large
credit unions at five and two, respectively, the average market in the sample has
roughly 2.78 community banks and 0.46 large credit unions.
1.4.3 Financial and physical characteristics of banks and credit unions in the
sample
The resulting 2010 sample markets contain 5,265 community bank and 708 large
credit union branches. In the analyses, I treat branches of the same type as ho-
mogeneous competitors — I do not differentiate between single and multi-outlet
branches in the same market — thereby focusing on the count of branches in the
market. Moreover, I consider the community banks and large credit unions in
the sample to be representative of all of those that operate in the United States.
The FDIC and NCUA data contain balance sheet information that permits me
to determine the soundness of these assumptions. Branches in the sample typi-
cally operate few outlets; 80 percent of large credit unions and community bank
branches in the sample operate two or fewer outlets. While the large credit union
branches in the sample are in line in terms of balance sheet information with the
representative of branches at the national level, the community bank branches in
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the sample are significantly smaller than their national average. For large credit
unions, the average total assets and deposit held by the parent entities of branches
in the sample are 6 percent greater ($2.1 billion vs. $2.0 billion) and 10 percent
less ($1.7 billion vs. $1.8 billion) than their national average. For community
banks, the average total assets and deposit held by the parent entities of branches
in the sample are 41 percent ($251 million vs. $355 million) and 29 percent ($207
million vs. $293 million) less than their national average. Hence, the results are
likely to capture the competitive effects of the average large credit union in the
United States on the entry decision of smaller community banks in the United
States.
Tables 2 and 3 contain counts of market configuration of large credit unions
and community banks in 2010 and 2015, respectively. At least one community
banks is in nearly 1,500 markets in the sample. I observe roughly 500 markets
with community banks and large credit unions. Hence, the presence of commu-
nity banks is heavily represented in the sample. Note that the count of community
banks is declining with the count of large credit unions. The likelihood of commu-
nity bank entry increases in the count of community bank competitors: Markets
with four or fewer community banks are less likely on average to have a large
credit union present, with approximately 34 percent of these markets having a
large credit union. Alternatively, markets with seven or more community banks
have a large credit union entry rate of roughly 51 percent.
The distribution of community bank counts has a long right tale; roughly 87
percent of the sample has at most five community banks and the maximum number
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of observed community banks in the sample is eighteen. In addition, the number
of markets with more than two credit unions composes 2.3 percent. As discussed
in the previous section, the number of community banks and large credit unions in
a market are truncated at five and two due to not enough. Convergence problems
arise in the estimation procedure when including six or more community banks
and three or more large credit unions.
1.4.4 Characteristics of local banking markets
The succeeding variables are included as exogenous market covariates that may
affect the profitability of community banks and large credit unions across the mar-
kets in the sample: the number of farms, the number of non-farm establishments,
population, per capita income, the housing unit occupancy rate, the number of
large banks, and the number of small credit unions. Table 1 presents summary
statistics for these unscaled co-variates for 2010 and 2015. These variables are
intended to capture the demand for financial services products (e.g., loans and de-
posits) and competitive effects of institutions outside the scope of this study. If the
number of potential membership groups (e.g., teachers) rises with population, the
number of credit unions may be more significant in markets with larger population
size. The magnitude of farms and business establishments are likely correlated
with the demand for commercial loans. Moreover, the degree of occupancy rate is
likely correlated with the demand for mortgage loans. Each non-competitive co-
variate was re-scaled by dividing each observation by the mean of that variable.
These transformed variables all have a mean of one, which facilitates estimation.
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1.5 Results
The subsequent sub-sections present the results of the empirical analyses. The
first sub-section reports estimates from the baseline model that assumes that com-
munity bank and large credit union entry are independent. Second, results from
the sequential equilibrium model are reported to examine the stability of the es-
timates under different assumptions. Next, I estimate the sequential equilibrium
model using data from 2015 to test the long run equilibrium properties of the
model. Last, I report counterfactual estimates that demonstrate the competitive
effects of large credit unions on the entry of community banks and the market
structure of financial services firms.
1.5.1 Estimates from single-equation ordered probit models
Table 4 presents maximum likelihood estimates for ordered probit models of the
number of community banks competitors and large credit union competitors using
a cross-section of markets from 2010. These specifications control for the entry
decision of the other type, assuming their decision as exogenous and not imposing
the equilibrium conditions in Equation 8. Hence, the models do not ensure a
unique equilibrium market configuration. Table 5 presents the average simulated
effect of a one percent change in the covariates on the total number of community
banks and large credit unions.
The first panel provides estimates taking large credit union entry as exoge-
nous and concentrating on community bank entry. As expected, the estimates of
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the characteristics that relate to the demand for financial products and services are
positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that per capita income
is an important driver for community bank and large credit union entry. A one
percent increase in per capita income results in a 0.35 and 0.44 percent increase
in community banks and large credit unions, respectively. Large credit unions
and community banks may be more likely to overlap in markets with more high
income individuals, potentially due to the positive relationship between per capita
income and demand for deposits (e.g. Dick, 2008).
In addition, markets with more significant business activity and home-
ownership increases the value of community banks; a one percent increase in
business establishments and occupancy rate increases the number of community
banks by 1.02 and 0.19 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the number of
farms, establishments, and occupancy rate has an economically insignificant ef-
fect on large credit union entry, all effects are close to zero. These results suggest
that community banks and large credit unions may not have significant overlap on
commercial and mortgage loans.
Last, population is a major driver for large credit union entry, while being
an economically insignificant motivator of community bank entry. A one percent
increase in population results in a 0.13 and 1.06 percent increase in community
banks and large credit unions, respectively. Population may be correlated with
the number of potential consumer loan customers, resulting in more large credit
unions in markets with greater populations. On the other hand, larger markets may
be disadvantageous for community banks, as “relationship lending” may become
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more difficult or less useful in larger markets.
The effects of own type entry on community bank entry are negative, with
value declining most strongly in moving from a monopoly to a duopoly market,
and narrowing as more community banks enter. The decreasing relationship be-
tween the number of community banks and their competitive effects suggests that
the competitive impact of the first community bank is greater than the following
entrants. These effects are consistent with a standard Cournot model of competi-
tion, as the additional competitive impact of entry declines as the number of firms
rise. The presence of large credit unions has a statistically significant impact on
community bank entry. However, the effect is small in comparison to the effect of
a rival community bank on community bank entry, as it would take 8 to 10 large
credit unions to arrive at the same impact. This result suggests that differences and
products and services between the two diminishes the competitive effect of large
credit unions on community bank entry, Although the negative sign and statistical
significance of the coefficient imply the multiplicity problem may bias the esti-
mate. Additional modeling techniques are required in order to ensure robustness
of the results.
In addition, the effect of the presence of community banks on large credit
union entry is small and statistically insignificant. However, as there are very few
observations where large credit unions are active and community banks are not,
this effect may not be identified.
Note that the effect of the presence of large banks on community bank
entry is negative, statistically significant, and nearly double the impact of large
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credit unions. This is expected, as Cohen and Mazzeo (2008) found evidence
that multi-market and single-market banks compete to a degree. Although this
variable is likely to have similar multiplicity problems with community banks as
large credit union, the inclusion of the large bank co-variate does not significantly
affect the estimate of the parameter for the effect of large credit union entry on
community bank value. This result suggests that potential bias in the large credit
union competitive effect on community bank entry arising from the correlation of
large credit union and large bank entry is negligible.
Similar to large banks and community banks, the presence of small credit
unions has a negative and statistically significant impact on large credit union
entry. This results is in line with expectations, since small and large credit unions
offer similar products, automobile loans. However, the multiplicity problem may
bias the estimate.
1.5.2 Estimates from endogenous entry model
Table 6 reports estimates of competitive effects on community bank and large
credit union entry decisions from the endogenous entry model. Since the estimates
of the effects of the demand characteristics do not change significantly in these
models, I omit them from the table. The first column displays estimates from the
model that assumes that community banks enter first when values of unobserved
portions of profit produce multiple equilibria, while the second column shows
estimates from the model that assumes that large credit unions enter first. The
results of these models show little discernible difference between the basic model
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and the one that corrects for the multiplicity problem. This finding suggests that
community bank and large credit union are independent of one another.
The most notable difference from Table 5 is the cross-competitive effects;
the competitive effects of large credit union entry are generally statistically in-
significant after including the equilibrium assumptions. This result suggests that
large credit unions and community banks serve separate markets, once market
characteristics are controlled for. Assuming the robustness of the long run equi-
librium properties of the model, these results imply that large credit union do not
crowd out community banks.
1.5.3 Boundaries of local markets and the endogenous entry model
An important assumption of the model is that markets do not overlap with other
markets. If the markets in the sample are not sufficiently isolated, the estimates
of the effect of competition on profits for each type will be biased downwards,
since institutions in nearby geographies could have already created a competitive
environment. In order to ensure that the estimates are not biased by these ef-
fects, similar to Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) I estimate the parameters of the profit
functions using rural markets that are at least ten miles away from a Metropolitan
Statistical Area. Table 7 reports the estimates of the parameters in the endogenous
entry model for community bank and large credit unions using 565 rural markets.
The results of the estimation procedure demonstrate that the results are ro-
bust to the assumption of market isolation. The effect of large credit union en-
trants on community bank entry in rural markets are similar to those shown in
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the baseline endogenous entry model. Moreover, the competitive effects of credit
unions on community bank entry in rural markets are smaller than the baseline
estimates, suggesting that potential market overlap does not bias the baseline es-
timates downward.
1.5.4 Long run properties of the endogenous entry model
To test the dynamic properties of the endogenous entry model described in the
previous subsection, I estimate the model using a cross section of data from 2015.
From 2010 to 2015, banking markets experienced regulatory and demand changes.
Most notably, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act—regulation
that increased federal compliance—was implemented and executed in the early
2010’s. At the same time, many large banks closed branches in rural markets.13
Table 8 reports parameter estimates of the endogenous entry model for
2015. Competitive parameter estimates using 2015 data are similar to the pa-
rameter estimates previously described; which demonstrates that the results are
robust to the dynamic assumptions of the model. Although the estimate of large
credit unions effect on community banks is slightly larger in magnitude, the re-
sults suggest that large credit unions serve different markets. Furthermore, these
results imply that the long-term viability of markets with both large credit unions
and community banks.
13See Nguyen (2014).
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1.5.5 Counterfactuals
To understand the extent that the presence of large credit unions have on the en-
try of community banks, I run a series of exercises that examine counterfactual
markets under a scenario of perfect differentiation between their products and ser-
vices. Doing this will allow for clarity in how competition from large credit unions
affects the viability of community bank entry and if large credit unions represent
more variety in products and services for consumers. To better capture recent in-
stitutional realities of the market, the counterfactuals use parameter inputs from
2015 displayed in Table 9.
First, I calculate the expected number of community banks and large credit
unions as
E(NCB) =
5∑
i=1
2∑
j=0
i · Prob(NCB = i, NLCU = j) (1.9)
and
E(NLCU) =
5∑
i=0
2∑
j=1
j · Prob(NCB = i, NLCU = j) (1.10)
where Prob(NCB = i, NLCU = j) is the probability of observing a market con-
figuration (i, j) as defined in equation 8. Second, I calculate the expected number
of community banks and large credit unions in the “base” case with the actual
demand and market configuration characteristics. The simulation predicts 2.78
community banks and 0.46 large credit unions, roughly equal to the observed av-
erage number of community banks and large credit unions. This confirms that the
model with the estimated parameter fits the data reasonably well.
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Next, I measure how the competitive impact of large credit unions affects
the entry of community banks. I accomplish this by comparing the actual market
structure from the sample with a scenario where community banks and large credit
unions do not compete, and thus offer completely separate products and services.
This is done by setting the competitive effect of large credit unions on community
bank entry to zero and vice versa. After eliminating competition between the two,
the number of community banks grows by 2.2 percent and the number of large
credit unions grows by 4.5 percent. This is not an economically significant change.
To put it into context, the increase in community banks is only 14.7 percent of the
large credit unions in the sample. These results provide further evidence of the
existence of economically significant differentiation between community banks
and large credit unions.
Alternatively one can interpret the results of the counterfactual to how large
credit unions affect the total number of institutions in the market. If large credit
unions were removed from the market, the removal of their competitive pressure
would result in fewer community banks replacements than large credit union re-
movals. Without large credit unions, the total number of institutions would decline
from 5,722 to 5,040 or by 13.5 percent. Since large credit unions have signifi-
cantly more assets than community banks, this result likely understates the effect
the impact they have on financial services availability.
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1.5.6 Discussion
The findings of the empirical analysis reveal that although there is overlap between
community banks and large credit unions product and services, it is not large
enough to significantly impact the entry of community banks. Counterfactual
exercises reveal that competition from large credit unions reduces the number of
community banks by only 2.5 percent or by 124 locations. This suggests that
enough differences in their products and services allows for community banks to
operate profitably in markets with large credit unions.
The findings of the counterfactural suggest that the presence of large credit
unions provides more financial options for consumers. The counterfactual exer-
cise reveals that large credit unions may increase product and service variety for
consumers, as the total number of institutions is 13.5 percent greater due to their
presence. As large credit unions are significantly greater in asset size than com-
munity banks, this one-to-one replacement line of reasoning likely understates
their impact on the market.
The results of my study support the notion that large credit unions pro-
vide services and products to unique consumer groups. Credit unions’ focus on
retail-oriented products and services may allow for community banks to operate
profitably by focusing on commercial loans. Policies that encourage large credit
union entry, such as the federal corporate income tax exemption, may lead to
more products and services for consumers. However, these results hold only at
the current regulatory regime. If large credit unions are granted greater access to
32
commercial loan markets or allowed to expand their membership pools to more
consumers, the competitive effect may increase. The results of this study should
be reevaluated in the event that policy changes take place.
1.6 Conclusion
This study sought to determine the extent to which large credit unions compete
with community banks in 1,771 local financial services markets. Recent policy
evaluation of the necessity for credit union tax exemption brings the need for
analysis on the effect of credit unions on community bank entry. In order to iden-
tify this effect, I estimated a structural model of entry that allowed me to capture
the causal relationship of competition on market structure, while also addressing
the multiplicity problem.
Estimated competitive parameters derived from a model of endogenous en-
try suggest that while large credit unions have a statistically significant negative ef-
fect on the entry of community banks, they are disproportionately small compared
to the effect of other community bank competitors, suggesting that economically
significant differentiation between products and services exist between the two.
Moreover, my results are robust to order of entry, dynamics, and market boundary
assumptions. Competitive pressure from large credit unions only result in 2.5 per-
cent fewer community banks. On the other hand, large credit unions provide 13.5
percent more locations, suggesting that large credit unions serve different markets
than community banks.
There exist many potential interpretations of these results. One is that the
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goals of large credit unions to offer consumers loans, such as automobile loans,
steers them away from markets important to community banks. Automobile loans
are still a significant portion of large credit union loans and they do not appear
to be moving away from this service. The other is that regulation on member
business loans prevent large credit unions from competing with community banks
on commercial loans. Last, consumers may simply prefer credit unions for some
loans, such as vehicle loans, while community banks for others, such as business
and mortgage loans.
The results of my study suggest that further expansion of credit unions into
local markets may provide unique services to consumers. Any policies that dis-
courage the entry of credit unions, such as lifting tax exemption status, may lead
to a decrease in financial services firms in local financial services markets. As
a result, policymakers should be aware that enacting policies under the guise of
leveling the competitive field may hurt consumers. In addition, the notion that
products and services of large credit unions should be constrained to encourage
community bank entry is a fruitless one. Enough separation of products and ser-
vices currently allows for a mixture of community banks and large credit unions
in markets.
As credit unions continue to expand in asset size and product services,
competition may become more intense, and the role of credit unions in anti-trust
calculations may require updates. Policymakers should continue to evaluate the
competitive impact of credit unions on large banks and community banks in future
policy discussions.
34
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics, profit shifters
2010
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Population (000s) 23.46 20.18 0.30 99.64
Per capita income (000s) 32.27 7.03 14.36 105.40
# of farms (00s) 5.50 4.92 0.00 55.91
# of establishments (00s) 5.40 5.25 0.00 62.65
Occupancy rate 0.80 0.10 0.17 0.95
# of LBs 2.47 1.73 0.00 5.00
Pres of SCU 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Community banks 2.67 1.59 0.00 5.00
Large credit unions 0.40 0.64 0.00 2.00
2015
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Population (000s) 23.38 20.29 0.30 98.88
Per capita income (000s) 38.97 10.42 16.00 143.47
# of farms (00s) 6.27 4.59 0.00 55.91
# of establishments (00s) 5.30 5.15 0.00 6.22
Occupancy rate 0.79 0.11 0.16 0.95
# of LBs 2.18 1.73 0.00 5.00
Pres of SCU 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Community banks 2.78 1.60 0.00 5.00
Large credit unions 0.46 0.64 0.00 2.00
Number of Markets = 1,771
Note: Numbers of large banks and community banks are truncated at five
and numbers of large credit unions and small credit unions are truncated at 1 and 2.
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Table 1.2: Market configurations for 2010
Large Credit Unions
0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Community banks 0 103 31 6 2 0 0 142
1 256 72 17 5 1 0 351
2 267 75 19 3 3 0 367
3 250 68 23 4 0 1 346
4 155 44 15 5 2 0 221
5 84 42 12 4 0 0 142
6 51 23 7 2 0 0 83
7 22 12 4 2 1 0 41
8 14 6 6 0 1 1 28
9 11 4 2 2 0 0 19
10 2 6 1 1 0 0 10
11 5 2 2 1 0 0 10
12 5 2 0 0 0 0 7
13 0 2 1 0 0 0 3
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
18 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 1,227 389 115 31 8 2 1,771
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Table 1.3: Market configurations for 2015
Large Credit Unions
0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Community banks 0 87 45 8 2 0 0 142
1 194 81 27 4 1 0 307
2 251 74 24 5 3 1 358
3 243 75 20 7 2 0 347
4 150 57 21 2 2 0 232
5 97 42 12 4 1 0 156
6 60 26 7 2 0 0 95
7 22 14 4 1 2 0 43
8 17 9 4 1 0 0 31
9 8 8 4 3 1 1 25
10 8 6 2 0 0 0 16
11 4 2 1 2 0 0 9
12 5 3 1 0 0 0 9
13 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
18 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 1,148 442 135 34 12 2 1,771
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Table 1.4: Single-equation ordered probit models of the numbers of community
banks and large credit unions
Number of Community Banks Number of Large Credit Unions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population 0.23∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Per capita income 0.68∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.31∗ 0.33∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18)
# of farms 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
# of establishments 0.38∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ −0.10 −0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Occupancy rate 2.01∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ −0.08 −0.04
(0.18) (0.18) (0.28) (0.28)
# of LCUs −0.08∗∗∗
(0.01)
# of CBs −0.02
(0.02)
Pres of SCUs 0.12 0.11 −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
# of LBs −0.23∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
# of CBs = 2 −0.97∗∗∗ −0.97∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
# of CBs = 3 −0.68∗∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03)
# of CBs = 4 −0.63∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
# of CBs = 5 −0.50∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
# of LCUs = 2 −1.13∗∗∗ −1.13∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Log Likelihood −2,759.04 −2,761.89 −1,176.28 −1,146.09
Number of Markets = 1,771
Note: ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent p-value ≤ 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Average simulated effect of of change in the covariates on the total
number of community banks and large credit unions
Community Banks Large Credit Unions
Population 0.13% 1.06%
Income per capita 0.35% 0.44%
# of farms 0.21% −0.04%
# of establishments 0.19% −0.12%
Occupancy rate 1.02% −0.06%
# of LBs −2.86% 4.52%
Pres of SCUs 0.20% −1.37%
Note: Reported estimates represent percent changes in entrants
after a one percent increase in the control variable.
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Table 1.6: Comparison of endogenous entry model estimates under alternative
assumptions of order of entry
Community Banks Large Credit Unions
Move First Move First
(1) (2)
Select Community Bank Value Shifters
# of LCUs −0.09 −0.12∗
(0.06) (0.07)
Pres of SCUs 0.11∗ 0.10∗
(0.06) (0.06)
# of LBs −0.22∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
# of CBs = 2 −0.99∗∗∗ −0.97∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04)
# of CBs = 3 −0.68∗∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
# of CBs = 4 −0.63∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
# of CBs = 5 −0.50∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Select Large Credit Union Value Shifters
# of LBs 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02)
Pres of SCUs −0.28∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
# of CBs 0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.02)
# of LCUs = 2 −1.13∗∗∗ −1.13∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Log Likelihood -3,903.96 -3,903.72
Number of Markets = 1,771
Note: ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent p-value ≤ 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Comparison of endogenous entry model estimates using rural markets
Community Banks Large Credit Unions
Move First Move First
(1) (2)
Select Community Bank Value Shifters
# of LCUs −0.05 −0.07
(0.10) (0.12)
Pres of SCUs 0.09 0.08
(0.06) (0.10)
# of LBs −0.22∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
# of CBs = 2 −0.94∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08)
# of CBs = 3 −0.73∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06)
# of CBs = 4 −0.63∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05)
# of CBs = 5 −0.51∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Select Large Credit Union Value Shifters
# of LBs 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Pres of SCUs −0.36∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13)
# of CBs 0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.06)
# of LCUs = 2 −1.11∗∗∗ −1.11∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09)
Log Likelihood -1,244.50 -1,244.46
Number of Markets = 565
Note: ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent p-value ≤ 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Comparison of model estimates derived using 2015 data
Community Banks Large Credit Unions
Move First Move First
(1) (2)
Select Community Bank Value Shifters
# of LCUs −0.13∗∗ −0.16∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)
Pres of SCUs 0.10∗∗ 0.09∗
(0.06) (0.06)
# of LBs −0.24∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
# of CBs = 2 −0.87∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
# of CBs = 3 −0.67∗∗∗ −0.67∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
# of CBs = 4 −0.62∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
# of CBs = 5 −0.48∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Select Large Credit Union Value Shifters
# of LBs 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02)
Pres of SCUs −0.22∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
# of CBs −0.02 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
# of LCUs = 2 −1.17∗∗∗ −1.16∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Log Likelihood −4,026.86 −4,027.03
Number of Markets = 1,771
Note: ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent p-value ≤ 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 1.9: Product overlap’s impact on market structure
Base No Product
Overlap
Average
Community Banks 2.78 2.85
Large Credit Unions 0.46 0.48
Total
Community Banks 4,916 5,040
Large Credit Unions 806 842
Percent Change
Community Banks 0.02
Large Credit Unions 0.04
Note: The above table displays predicted numbers of firms, as well as changes
under counterfactual assumptions on entry decisions.
Equilibrium entry predictions are based on the parameter estimates
in Table 8. The Base case corresponds to the demographics used in
estimation; in the data, the observed number of firms averages to
2.78 and 0.46 for community banks and large credit unions, respectively.
Columns (3) illustrates market structure outcomes under
the absence of product overlap between large credit unions and community banks.
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Figure 1.1: Multiplicity problem for a 2 by 2 game
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CHAPTER 2
FOCAL POINTS, MARKET POWER, AND TACIT COLLUSION IN
LOCAL PAYDAY LENDING MARKETS
2.1 Introduction
In the United States and many other countries, payday loans are notorious for their
high interest rates relative to other credit products.1 Given these high rates, many
countries have established inquires into whether any feature or combination of
features in payday loan market distorts competition.2 Lately, the preponderance
of payday lenders in the United States to charge fees near the regulated limit has
drawn the criticism of consumer advocacy groups and regulators. Critics point
to the drastic differences in fees charged by lenders in states with high and low
fee caps.3 Given that over 19 million households use payday loans in the United
States, efficient and competitive payday loan pricing is a critical societal issue.
This study empirically investigates the if non-binding fee caps can be used as
1”A $300 cash advance on the average credit card, repaid in one month, would cost $13.99
finance charge and an annual interest rate of almost 57%. By comparison, a payday loan costing
$17.50 per $100 for the same $300 would cost $105 if renewed one time or 426% annual interest.”-
Consumer Federation of America (2017)
2Notably, in 2013 the Competition and Market Authority investigated competition in United
Kingdom payday lending markets. The commission found that “...entry by new firms into the
payday lending market does not appear to have resulted in existing lenders facing an effective
constraint when setting their prices.”
3‘Pews research indicates that a states limit on interest rates is the key factor driving loan
pricing. The four largest payday lenders in the United States charge similar prices within a given
state, with rates set at or near the maximum allowed by law. But in states with higher or no interest
rate limits, the same companies charge comparable borrowers far more for essentially the same
small-loan product.” Pew Charitable Trusts (2014).
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focal points by payday lenders in the United States to facilitate tacit collusion in
1,978 local markets.
Knittel and Stango’s (2003) seminal study on credit pricing and price ceil-
ings revealed that usage of focal points as a facilitator of tacit collusion, and larger
profit margins, is more common in less competitive markets. On the surface, the
features of the payday lending industry are inconsistent with characteristics that
may facilitate a systemic collusive environment. There is little evidence exists to
suggest significant barriers to entry or exit, high sunk costs of entry or scarcity
of production inputs are issues in the industry. Payday loans are close to a ho-
mogeneous good and the nearly 18,000 stores in the United States suggest low
barriers to entry. Also, empirical evidence indicates that profit margins in the pay-
day lending industry are smaller than those of other credit products (Flannery and
Samolyk, 2005). Despite these characteristics, this study finds evidence of tacit
collusion at focal points in payday lending markets as the results suggest that pay-
day lenders earn higher profits in markets with sufficiently high, non-binding fee
caps.
Yet, a regime of tacit collusion can be broken by a sufficient number of
competitors. Knittel and Stango (2003) find that tacit collusion at a focal point
is less frequent in markets with more firms. Perhaps if tacit collusion occurs
only in markets with an inadequate number of lenders, then the problem may be
just in small markets. However, the results imply that in markets with one to
five payday lenders and non-binding fee caps, tacit collusive regimes continue to
persist. Hence, the problem of tacit collusion may be found in both markets with
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modest and robust numbers of payday lenders.
Unlike most studies of focal points as a facilitator of tacit collusion, signif-
icant payday loan price or profit margin data at the market level for a substantial
number of markets are unavailable. Although these data are not available, this
study uses structural techniques that do not require prices to make inference on
how non-binding fee caps impact profit margins and how those profit margins re-
late to the number of lenders in a local market. Empirical models of endogenous
entry, first used by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), allow for identification of how
market structure impacts profit margins and thus provides for inference on how
market structure relates to competition, using only information on locations of
firms and market sizes. Because profits must be at least greater than zero for a
firm to choose to enter a market, market characteristics effects on the decision
to enter reveal how market structure affects profits. Moreover, how minimum
market sizes needed for entry or entry threshold respond to market structures can
reveal how competition affects profit margins. If competition reduces profit mar-
gins, firms require a larger volume of sales to cover entry costs, so the minimum
market size needed for entry expands.
The predictions of entry thresholds can also determine when a price ceiling
is binding or non-binding and the qualitative differences in profit margins across
price ceiling regimes. The first approach is constructed from the notion that a price
ceiling is binding when profit margins in markets with price ceilings at a certain
level are smaller than those in markets without price ceilings. In other words, the
price ceiling value that equates profits in markets with and without price ceilings
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is near the upper-bound value that results in a binding price ceiling. The second
approach comes from the concept that if entry thresholds are significantly smaller
than those in markets without price ceilings, then profit margins are more signif-
icant in markets with non-binding price ceilings. Hence, if entry thresholds of
payday lenders in markets with non-binding fee caps are smaller than those in
markets without fee caps, then there is evidence of tacit collusion at focal points
in the market.
Using payday lender location data acquired from yellowpages.com in 2017,
this study finds evidence that supports the notion that non-binding fee caps can be
used by payday lenders to tacitly collude. First, the full sample model predicts that
payday loan fee caps tend to be binding at a 556 annual percentage rate. Control-
ling for local demand and cost characteristics, a fee cap of 780 percent in markets,
as in Louisiana, leads to 7.14 percent more payday lenders than in markets with-
out fee caps. A more considerable magnitude of entry into these markets suggests
that markets with non-binding fee caps are more profitable than markets without
fee caps, implying that they can be used as focal points to facilitate tacit collusion.
Second, differences in entry thresholds between the average market with
binding fee caps and the average market without fee caps are economically sig-
nificant. Binding fee caps at low levels significantly affect payday lender entry.
For example, a fee cap rate of 156 percent, as in Oregon, reduces the number of
lenders relative to a market without fee caps by roughly 11 percent. At binding
levels, the results show that fee caps may minimize payday lender profitability.
Next, models estimated with three sub-sample groups for each fee cap
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regime show that entry thresholds are smaller in markets with non-binding fee
caps compared to those in markets without fee caps. Payday lender entrants in
markets with non-binding fee caps require on average roughly 29 percent smaller
market size, or about 7,000 fewer consumers per entrant, than lenders in markets
without fee caps. Also, lenders entering binding fee caps require on average ap-
proximately 14 percent greater market size, or around 4,000 more consumers per
entrant, than lenders in markets without fee caps. These findings further imply that
payday lenders use non-binding price ceilings as focal points for tacit collusion
and binding fee caps reduce a payday lender’s profitability.
Lastly, the competitive effect of entry is constant in markets with non-
binding fee caps as well as markets with other fee cap regimes. Calculated entry
threshold ratios reveal that the competitive outcomes of entry are negligible in all
types of payday loan markets. These effects suggest that tacit collusion could oc-
cur in markets from one to five lenders as well as the potential for market power
in general payday lending markets. Moreover, the results suggest that decreases
in the number of firms due to binding fee caps will not result in reductions to
competition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section presents
an overview of the theoretical and empirical background of focal points as a fa-
cilitator of tacit collusion. The third section discusses an overview of the payday
lending industry. The fourth section describes an empirical model of endogenous
entry in local payday lending markets. Next, the fifth section presents an overview
of the market level data as well as the web-scrapping procedure used to collect
49
lender location data. Next, the sixth section reports the estimated parameters of
the payday lender profit function as well as calculated values and patterns of entry
thresholds. This section also presents values and trends of the entry thresholds for
payday lenders in markets without fee caps and with binding and non-binding fee
caps. The seventh section concludes.
2.2 Focal points and tacit collusion
Tacit collusion often requires successful coordination. Firms can address the coor-
dination problem through many mechanisms. One mechanism is the use of focal
points. For example, suppose two people attempt to meet in New York City with-
out first proposing where to meet. Given that there are a significant number of
possible meeting points, the likelihood that they encounter are small. However, if
both choose to go to a prominent location in the city, such as the Statue of Liberty
or Grand Central Station, the probability they successfully meet becomes higher.
In scenarios where firms set prices, it is often implied that the “agglomeration” of
prices occurs at specific focal points (e.g., recommended retail prices).
As discussed by Scherer (1967), focal points may assist firms in tacit col-
lusion and lead to supra-competitive prices. There are many explanations to why
firms can take advantage of focal points. One possibility is that market power
allows firms to cooperate. In a market where firms have elastic residual demand,
the incentive to undercut a rival may be too strong to coordinate. For example, in
markets where cooperation is difficult to maintain, such as markets where prod-
ucts are very similar (Chang, 1991), the presence of focal points may have little
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effect on prices. Alternatively, when firms possess significant market power such
as in markets with switching costs (Klemperer, 1987), focal points may lead prices
above the competitive outcome.
Several empirical studies examine the issue of focal points as a facilitator of
tacit collusion. Knittel and Stango (2003) find that non-binding price ceilings can
serve as a focal point of collusion in the credit card industry, as they lead to higher
prices than markets without price ceilings. Danzon and Chao (2000) find that price
regulations in pharmaceutical markets decrease competition. Busse (2000) pro-
poses that cellular telecommunications firms competing in multiple markets used
price schedules from other markets as a focal point to maintain supra-competitive
prices. Lewis (2013) determines that odd-numbered pricing points can be used
as focal points to facilitate tacit collusion. DeYoung and Phillips (2013) find that
payday loan prices in Colorado rose after the imposition of a price ceiling, con-
sistent with price ceilings as focal points of collusion. These studies find evidence
that tacit collusion at a focal point is more likely when firms have greater market
power.
2.3 The payday lending industry
Payday loans are small amounts of credit loaned at high rates of interest on the
agreement that they will be repaid when the borrower receives their next paycheck.
Payday loans typically range from $100 to $500 and are repayable in no more
than two weeks. Finance fees, the price of a payday loan, are conditional on the
size of the loan and typically range from $15 to $30 for every $100 loaned. On
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a $100 loan repaid in two weeks, this amounts to an annual percentage rate of
roughly 391 to 782 percent. In most cases, to be issued a payday loan, a typical
potential borrower must show proof of residence, identification, employment and
a checking account, and must meet a minimum level of monthly income. If they
qualify, borrowers provide the lender with a postdated check for the amount of
the loan plus the finance fee (or provide authorization to their checking account).
Lastly, the process does not involve a standard credit check, and borrowing activity
is not reported to the national credit bureau.
2.3.1 Payday loan regulation
The price of a payday loan is usually not labeled as “interest”. Alternatively,
payday lenders label their charges as “fees.” With this classification, lenders can
avoid violating state usury laws which limit the amount of interest that can be
charged on a personal loan. However, many states have also passed laws and
installed regulations that target payday lenders and place limits on these fees.
Across states, regulations can span from effective bans on payday lending to few
and no restrictions. Many states impose usury regulations on payday loans. A
common usury regulation is fee caps, which limit the amount a payday lender can
charge on a payday loan. The differences across states in fee caps is considerable.
Fee caps can range from 45 to 1,500 percent. Also, the market fee for a payday
loan in many states tends to equal the fee cap. For example, the average market
fee for a payday loan and regulated fee cap on a payday loan in North Dakota
are both 520 percent. The average market fee for a payday loan and regulated fee
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cap on a payday loan fee cap and average finance fee in nearby Nebraska is 459
percent (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014). Given the propensity of lenders to charge
close to the fee cap and the variation in fee caps across states, it is plausible that
some states have binding fee caps while others have non-binding fee caps.
Since average fee charges in states without fee caps are higher than states
with fee caps, critics asset they are an efficient mechanism to reduce payday loan
costs (Pew Charitable Trust, 2014). However, the effectiveness of fee caps to
negatively affect payday lenders is questionable. Standaert and Weed (2010) find
that payday lenders reclassify themselves as brokers to charge the state fee caps
plus a “broker fee”. Also, there is empirical evidence that shows that fee caps
have an insignificant effect on payday lender entry. Ramirez (2013) indicates that
payday lender entry does not significantly decrease when a fee cap is imposed in
a market. Paradoxically, these fee caps may be used by payday lenders to increase
fees. DeYoung and Phillips (2013) find that average payday loan fees gravitated
towards a newly installed fee cap in Colorado. Since average fee charges in states
without fee caps are higher than states with fee caps, critics asset they are an
efficient mechanism to reduce payday loan prices.
2.3.2 Competition in payday lending markets
Payday lending markets possess many features that may promote competition.
Payday loans are reasonably homogeneous goods, input goods are not scarce,
and there are few barriers to entry and exit in the industry. A few studies have
found evidence of competition in the payday lending industry. Melzer and Morgan
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(2015) determine that the presence of payday lenders decreases overdraft prices
at conventional financial institutions. Moreover, DeYoung and Phillips (2013)
find a positive correlation between market concentration and payday loan fees in
Colorado.
As in other credit markets, competition may affect non-pecuniary aspects
of payday lending which may not reduce prices but may reduce profit margins.
If competition pressures lenders to make riskier loans, loan loss rates will in-
crease, and profit margins will decline. Keeley (1990) provides evidence that the
increased competition produced by relaxation of state branching restrictions in the
1980s caused large U.S. bank holding companies to improve their risk profiles, as
proxied by estimates of market capital-to-asset ratios and actual interest costs on
large certificate of deposits.
Payday loans are riskier than other credit products. Montezemolo and
Wolff (2015) found that approximately half of all borrowers default on a payday
loan within their first two years of borrowing. Loan loss rates can explain why
prices are high and profit margins are low in the industry. Flannery and Samolyk
(2005) find evidence that payday loan finance fees capture the cost of loan loss
associated with the payday lending consumer base. Standard financial models
predict that an interest rate needed for a lender to receive an expected positive
return rise as the borrower’s credit risk increases.
Ausebel (1991) argues that adverse selection, switching costs, and con-
sumer irrationality may diminish the role of competition in credit rates. Adverse
selection has been well documented in the payday lending industry. Dobbie and
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Skiba (2013) find evidence of adverse selection as borrowers who choose to take
out more significant first-time loans are more likely to default. Because the in-
dustry does not widely use credit checks, borrowers may have more significant
private information on their credit risk. If payday lenders have difficulty separat-
ing bad (defaulting) and good (eventually repaying) borrowers, they may be less
likely to engage in activities that disproportionately draw in bad borrowers.
Switching costs may make it costly for good borrowers to shop for a new
payday lender. Since industry participants view repeat business as a critical com-
ponent of profits, many payday lenders offer loyalty programs and rewards cards.
These mechanisms encourage borrowers to become repeat customers with offers
like: “if you pay your interest five times in a row on time, you get your sixth
interest payment at half price.”4 The process of taking out an additional loan to
cover a portion of a previous loan is known as “rolling over”. Evidence suggests
that the practice of rolling over increases payday lender profitability. Stegman and
Faris (2003) find that the conversion of one time borrowers to chronic borrowers
increases payday lender profitability. With these market implications in mind,
lenders may provide disincentives for good borrowers to shop for a different pay-
day loan provider.
With switching costs, the pool of consumers looking for a payday lender
may be disproportionately bad borrowers. Skiba and Tobacman (2006) find that
1 percent of accepted first-time applicants go to a different store for their second
loan application, while 6 percent of failed first-time applicants go to a different
4See Martin (2010).
55
location for their second application. If payday lenders reduce their loan fees to
attract consumers from rival stores, they may draw more bad than good borrowers.
Hence, the cost of dealing with bad borrowers may reduce the incentive for a new
payday loan store to lower prices to steal rivals’ borrowers.
Moreover, if borrowers discount the future costs of payday loans, they
may not react to lower cost loans offered by nearby payday lenders. Bertrand
and Morse (2013) find evidence of the relationship between borrowing and cost
insensitivity as they determine that after consumers become more aware of the
adding-up dollar fees incurred when rolling over payday loans, payday loan usage
declines by 11%.
2.4 An empirical model of endogenous entry decisions in the payday lending
industry
Oligopoly models of dynamic interactions show that firms can sustain prices above
the static competitive level by using the threat of future punishment to support co-
operation. Many studies assume that collusion will occur at the monopoly price
level since it provides symmetric firms the highest possible profits in a collusive
regime.5 Regrettably, according to the “Folk Theorem”, any price between the
competitive level and some maximum sustainable price will be an equilibrium in
a dynamic game. The nearly infinite number of possible equilibrium outcomes
make it difficult for economists to construct tests of collusive behavior.
To accomplish this problem, this study uses techniques similar to those
5See, for example, Porter (1983), Ellison (1994), and Genesove and Mullin (1998)
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developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) that can determine and contrast market
conduct in markets with and without focal points. In particular, this study develops
a discrete choice model relating the number of lenders in a market to demand and
cost characteristics of that market that allows for identification of market conduct
without the need of profit margin data. Moreover, this method can determine the
values that lead to binding fee caps. This value is the fee cap in a market that
results in lenders earning fewer profits than lenders operating in markets without
fee caps. Thus, this study can determine the economic significance of market
conduct in markets with and without focal point prices.
A lenders entry decision depends on the profits that it expects to earn fol-
lowing entry, given the entry decisions of other potential lenders in the market,
the nature of post-entry competition, and demand and cost characteristics. Let the
long-run profit of a lender i in a market k be a function of the number of incumbent
lenders in the market and demand and cost characteristics of the market. Strictly
speaking, profits are given by Π(Yk, Nk, Xk,Wk) where Yk is a scalar representing
market size, such as total population or income, Nk is the number of lenders in a
market, andXk andWk are vectors of variables denoting demand and cost charac-
teristics. This expression is a reduced-form, equilibrium long-run profit function
that captures the outcome of competition between lenders in market k.
In an ideal world, the model would include product and other store level
characteristics. These characteristics, such as productivity and brand recognition,
would allow for heterogeneous profit functions across payday lenders in the data.
However, in reality, these data are not available in this study. Hence, the inclusion
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of a stochastic, unobserved component of profit k is necessary in order to identify
the effects of the variables that affect observed profit pi(Yk, Nk, Xk,Wk). Also, the
unobserved and observed component of profits must be common for all lenders in
a market k. In other words, a shift in demand for payday loans in market k has
an equal effect on all lenders in the market. These conditions result in long-run
equilibrium profits
Π(Yk, Nk, Xk,Wk) = pi(Yk, Nk, Xk,Wk) + k. (2.1)
Although these assumptions are restrictive; they have useful implications.
If observed profits decline in the number of lenders, the assumption that profit
is only affected by market-specific characteristics implies that the standard Nash
equilibrium of the entry game results in firms entering until it becomes unprof-
itable. In other words, the equilibrium number of incumbent payday lenders in a
market is the maximum number that the market can profitably sustain. Thus, this
assumption suggests that inequality conditions on profit describe the equilibrium
number of lenders in a market.6 The equilibrium number of firms in market k,
6In order to facilitate estimation, the maximum number of payday lenders is limited to five.
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denoted N∗k , is given by
N∗k =

0 for pi1k + εk < 0;
1 for pi1k + εk ≥ 0 and pi2k + εk < 0;
2 for pi2k + εk ≥ 0 and pi3k + εk < 0;
...
5 for pi5k + εk ≥ 0,
(2.2)
where piNk = pi(Yk, Nk = N,Xk,Wk). Another useful implication of the form
of long profits is the normality of the unobserved portion of profits. Because the
stochastic, unobserved component of profits is i.i.d. normal across markets, the
probabilities of observing N firms in market k are
P (Nk = N) =

1− Φ(pi1k) for N = 0;
Φ(pi1k)− Φ(pi2k) for N = 1;
Φ(pi2k)− Φ(pi3k) for N = 2;
...
Φ(pi5k) for N ≥ 5,
(2.3)
where Φ(·) is the distribution of a standard normal random variable with the vari-
ance of the stochastic, unobserved component of profit normalized to one.
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), assume that payday lenders’ unob-
served profits can be broken down into variable profits and fixed costs. Variable
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profits are linear in market size and the slope of profits in market size may vary
across market structures. Assume that fixed costs may also differ over market
structure due to barriers to entry or differences in efficiency. Strictly speaking, if
lenders must invest in multiple outlet locations to steal an incumbent’s consumers
by offering better convenience to consumers, entry costs will be higher for addi-
tional lenders. Unobserved profits for a firm in market k are
pi(Yk, Nk, Xk,Wk) = V (Nk, Xk)Yk − F (Nk,Wk). (2.4)
Furthermore, for simplicity, assume that variable profits and fixed costs are
composed of a linear combination of the number of lenders and demand and cost
characteristics, respectively. For a market k with N firms, variable profits are
V (Nk, Xk) =
N∑
i=1
αi + αXXk (2.5)
and fixed costs are
F (Nk, Xk) =
N∑
i=1
γi + αWWk. (2.6)
Substituting (5)-(6) into (4), yields
pi(Yk, Nk, Xk,Wk) = (
N∑
i=1
αi + αXXk)Yk − (
N∑
i=1
γi + αWWk). (2.7)
The dummy variables for market structure’s effect on variable profits and fixed
costs add up as new lenders enter the market. For example, the observed profit
for the payday lender monopolist is pi(Yk, Nk = 1, Xk,Wk) = (α1 + αXXk)Yk −
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(γ1 +αWWk) and the payday lender duopolist is pi(Yk, Nk = 2, Xk,Wk) = (α1 +
α2 + αXXk)Yk − (γ1 + γ2 + αWWk). To identify the estimates within the profit
function, the parameter attached to market size is set to one.
To identify the binding fee cap rate, the profits of lenders in markets without
fee caps are set to profits of lenders in markets with fee caps. Any fee cap rate
that results in lenders’ profits in markets with fee caps being smaller than lenders’
profits in markets without fee caps is likely binding. Formally, after setting profits
equal and rearranging terms, the fee cap rate R∗ that equates lenders’ profits in
markets with and without fee caps is
R∗ =
γNoFeeCap
γFeeCap
(2.8)
where γNoFeeCap and γFeeCap are the effects of being in a market without fee caps
and the impact of an additional unit of fee cap on lenders’ profits. Hence, a market
with fee caps higher than R∗ has a non-binding fee cap, while any market with fee
caps less than or equal to R∗ has a binding fee cap.
The probabilities of observing market structures as defined in Equation 3
produces a maximum likelihood function described in Equation 7. The empirical
model takes a similar form of that of an ordered probit. In order to determine the
robustness of the estimates to different definitions of market size, the model is
estimated using the market’s total population and the total income in place of Yk.
Payday lenders’ profit function reveals the market sizes needed to sup-
port a given number of entrants, or entry thresholds. Since the Nash Equilib-
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rium of the entry game predicts lender entry until profit is at least zero, one
could obtain the minimum market size needed to support entry of N lenders by
setting the profit function piN equal to zero and solving for Y . For the mini-
mum profit needed to support entry of N lenders into the average market, where
E(pi(Yk, N,Xk,Wk)) = pi(YN , N,X,W ), the average minimum market size needed
for entry is
YN =

γ1+αWW
α1+αXX
for N = 1
γ1+γ2+γWW
α1+α2+αXX
for N = 2
...
∑5
i=1 γi+γWW∑5
i=1 αi+αXX
for N ≥ 5
. (2.9)
where the coefficients are estimated using maximum likelihood.
As described in the Introduction, the pattern of entry thresholds needed
to support entry reveals the nature of competition in the market. If more signif-
icant competition reduces prices, leads lenders to make more sunk cost invest-
ments in quality, and encourages lenders to make riskier loans, then profit mar-
gins will decline, and lenders must need more borrowers to sustain entry. Since in
oligopolistic competition the competitive effect of entry converges to some limit,
entry thresholds will converge to some number as N approaches a large amount.
These conditions suggest that the entry thresholds rise in a concave, exponential
manner.
However, if payday lenders interact in a monopolistic or collusive setting,
the entry threshold will behave differently than in the oligopolistic case. If switch-
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ing costs, adverse selection, or consumer irrationality leads payday lenders to set
finance fees and loan offerings regardless of the number of lenders in the market,
profit margins will not decline with new entry. Non-decreasing profit margins im-
ply that the entry threshold needed will not rise and remain relatively constant as
the number of lenders approaches a significant amount.
With these conditions in mind, the model allows for inferences about the
competitive effects of new lenders without the presence of data such as price-cost
margins. By estimating the link between market structure and market character-
istics one can identify the ramifications of additional lenders on the intensity of
competition by examining the market features needed to support further lenders
across markets with and without focal points. However, the methodology can-
not determine the extent of collusion or market power within a market. In other
words, the model cannot predict the size of price markups as a result of coopera-
tion. However, the model can determine the change in market conduct concerning
market conduct and test this study’s question.
2.5 Data
The payday loan industry presents an ideal environment in which to implement
the techniques described in the previous section. An advantageous aspect of the
payday lending industry is that borrowers tend not to travel far for payday loan ser-
vices. Studies that examine payday lending behavior find that local demographics
are critical to entry decisions.7 Moreover, nearly three-quarters of payday loan
7See Prager (2009).
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borrowers obtain loans from physical locations.8 Hence, local market characteris-
tics are likely to affect the profits of local payday lenders.
Estimation of the model described in the previous section requires informa-
tion on the presence of payday lenders in the sample markets as well as demand
and cost characteristics of the market, including details on fee caps. Areas with
large populations may have many submarkets. To ensure the sample is composed
of isolated markets, this study defines a market as a contiguous US county or
parish in 2017 that satisfies the following criteria: (i) the total market population,
is less than 100,000 and (ii) payday lending is not effectively banned. Figure 1 de-
picts a map of lender locations in an example market within the sample: Oconee
County, South Carolina. Payday lenders in this sample market agglomerate in
the highest density area, Seneca, South Carolina. This example demonstrates the
benefit of sampling from small counties; payday lending markets are likely to be
isolated from other markets. The final sample includes 3,466 unique to the market,
payday lenders. States with active payday loan bans include: Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia.9 After removing mar-
kets that fail these criteria, 1,978 mid-sized markets compose the sample. Figure
2 displays a map of the locations of markets in the sample.
Information on the locations of payday lending firms in 2017 was obtained
from yellowpages.com. The web scrapping procedure was performed using the
8See Pew Charitable Trusts (2013).
9With the exception of Georgia, these states essentially ban payday loan rates by setting fee
caps below 36 percent.
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following method. First, a search query was entered into yellowpages.com for
outlets that offer payday loans in a zip-code from a set of counties with a popula-
tion less than 100,000. Next, the program collected the names of payday lenders
that operate within the entered zip code. After storing the data, the web scrapping
process was performed again until the entire set of zip codes were entered and the
data stored about 15,000 times. Finally, after finishing the procedure, the program
eliminated duplicate firms operating in the same market from the sample.
The final sample composes firms that offer payday loan services. Provided
that they make payday loan services, firms in the sample could also offer title
loans, checking services, pawn services. Moreover, this study treats lenders with
more than one outlet as precisely one lender. The model cannot predict the en-
try decisions of outlets into markets. Payday lenders are unlikely to cannibal-
ize profits of incumbent stores by adding more stores. Counting outlets as firms
would likely lead to an underestimation of the competitive effects. However, this
implication is not a serious concern, as markets with multiple stores constitute
forty-three percent of markets with at least one lender.
Table 1 presents an overview of the definitions and sources of variables
included in this study. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on market structure,
market size, demand, and cost variables in the sample markets. Variables within
the sample are at the county level for the year 2016. Fifty-one percent of the sam-
ple markets have at least one payday lender. The distribution of payday lenders
is right-skewed. To ensure parameter identification, it is necessary to truncate
the lender count distribution in estimation to provide a sufficiently large number
65
of market structure observations for each realized lender count. In other words,
there are not enough observations to identify the individual markets structure ef-
fects of beyond five operating lenders. With these considerations, there are 279
markets with one payday lender, 180 with two, 130 with three, 100 with four, and
268 markets with five or more payday lenders.
Markets with a more substantial population (Population) and total income
(Income) are more likely to have a more significant number of payday lenders.
Hence, as required in a standard entry model, the descriptive statistics support the
notion of a monotonic relationship between market structure and market size.
The profit function consists of demand variables income per capita (IncomePerCap),
poverty (Pov), African American population (BlackPop), and food insecurity
(FoodInsec) as well as cost variables median rent (Rent), annual percentage rate
of payday loan fee caps (FeeCap), and the state’s maximum loan amount allowed
by law (MaxLoan). The demand variables control for market specific shifters in
payday loan demand. For example, since payday loans may be an inferior good,
the demand for them may be more significant in markets with lower incomes.
Moreover, since African Americans historically have had less access to credit than
many racial groups (e.g., Blanchflower et. al, 2006), markets with highBlackPop
may have greater demand for alternative credit. Ideally, one would also include a
measure of financial instability when modeling the determinants of payday loan
profits. However, if a household is experiencing financial instability, it may have
difficulty in subsistence goods, such as food. Hence, FoodInsec proxies for fi-
nancial instability in the payday lender profit function. Rent is also included to
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control for the effect of local factor prices on profitability. However, it may be
difficult to determine the impact of Rent on profitability as it is likely correlated
with variables in the profit function.
Other variables that affect fixed costs include regulatory controls FeeCap
andMaxLoan. The FeeCap is the max annual percentage rate of a fee on a $100
payday loan allowed by the market’s state government.10 The average FeeCap
in a sample market is 402 percent. To ensure correct identification of the effect
of FeeCap and MaxLoan on payday lender profits, an indicator function for the
presence of a fee cap interacts with these covariates. The profit function contains a
dummy variableNoFeeCap to capture the effect of operating in a market without
a fee cap. States without fee caps include Delaware, Idaho, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and
Wisconsin.11 MaxLoan identify the maximum a loan amount a payday lender is
allowed to offer a borrower.
Table 3 displays summary statistics for market by fee caps regime. Fee
cap regimes, represented by columns 4-6, include no fee cap, non-binding fee
cap, and binding fee cap. On the surface, there appears to be little differences
in the mean demand and cost variables in each regime. However, the average
county population share of African Americans in markets with non-binding fee
caps is larger than the average sample mean. Moreover, the average number of
payday lenders in markets with non-binding fee caps is larger than the sample
mean. However, hypothesis tests reject the notion that differences in these means
10The fee cap rate is calculated by FeeCap = Fee×
365
14
100 .
11Ohio has a payday loan fee cap, but, as affirmed in Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott.,
lenders are not bound by them if they classify as mortgage lenders.
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are statistically significant.12
2.6 Results
Table 4 consists of the estimates from the single equation entry model, analogous
to the entry model of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). To reiterate from the previous
sections, this method is equivalent to a discrete choice model where one regresses
factors, such as market structure and demand and cost shifters, on the dependent
variable, the number of lenders, to expose characteristics of underlying profitabil-
ity. This approach yields consistent estimates and entry thresholds as long as the
stochastic, unobserved portion of profit ε is normal, and an ordered probit with
contributions to the likelihood function as described in Equation 3. In columns
1-3, market size Yk is defined as total county population (Population), while in
columns 4-6 market size is set as total county income (Income). Market size is
the sole explanatory variable in columns 1 and 4, while columns 2 and 5 contain
demand and cost characteristics and columns 3 and 6 add regulatory components.
Consistent with the entry literature, the estimates α2 to α5 and γ2 to γ5
measuring market structure’s effect on profitability have the expected signs. Ad-
ditional lenders appear to cause variable profits to fall, as the estimates of α2 to
α5 are negative, and lead fixed costs to rise, since the estimates of γ2 to γ5 are
positive. In contrast with most oligopoly models and with the results presented by
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), the magnitude of the effect of entry on variable prof-
its does not decrease and is constant as lenders enter the market. In other words,
12T-tests can be made available upon request.
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lender entry does not have a smaller incremental impact on conduct as the number
of lenders increases. However, fixed costs rise as more lenders enter the market.
In context to market behavior, incumbent lenders either utilize more efficient re-
sources (e.g., better locations) or are subject to barriers to entry (e.g., new entrants
must establish more outlets to match an incumbent’s quality).
The effects of demographic factors Pov, BlackPop, FoodInsec on vari-
able profits are positive and statistically significant, although IncomePerCap is
statistically insignificant in a few specifications. The average marginal effects cal-
culated from specification 3 reveal that a one percent increase in BlackPop leads
to on average a 14.70 percent increase in the likelihood of observing a market
structure of five or more firms. One explanation for these results is that people in
poverty and African Americans may lack access to conventional financial services
and, thus markets with more individuals in these groups have a higher demand for
payday loans. Poverty also has an economically significant positive effect on pay-
day lender entry as a one percent increase in Pov leads to on average a 39.20
percent increase in the likelihood of observing a market structure of five or more
firms.
Markets with greater factions of individuals who have difficulty in satis-
fying a subsistence level of consumption, as measured by FoodInsec, also have
a higher demand for payday loans. If these factors affected supply-side condi-
tions, one would expect a negative sign. Intuitively, the risk of not collecting a
loan should rise with the income uncertainty of the borrower. However, the re-
sults suggest that the markets which have more consumers who are financially
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insecure, impoverished, and credit constrained, the higher the profitability of pay-
day lenders. Hence, more substantial profits accruing from greater demand for
payday loans outweigh the cost of making loans to a riskier group of borrowers.
Regarding the demand characteristics, financial insecurity tends to have the most
significant economic effect on entry as a one percent increase in FoodInsec leads
to on average a 45.02 percent increase in the likelihood of observing a market with
five or more payday lenders.
Estimates of the effects ofRent,MaxLoan, andAPRcap on payday lend-
ing profitability suggest positive increases in these factors lead to adverse supply-
side effects. A rise in factor prices, such asRent, leads to higher fixed costs. How-
ever, Rent could also capture demand-side characteristics. For example, previous
results suggest that the demand for payday loans is more elevated in impoverished
markets and if rental prices correlate with household income, the Rent estimate
may capture the relationship between household income and payday loan demand.
The signage of the effect of FeeCap on profit margins shows that a decrease in
the fee cap rate leads to fewer payday lenders in a market. For example, a fee cap
rate of 156 points to an 11 percent decrease in the number of entrants relative to
entrants in markets without fee caps. At sufficiently low levels, the estimates of
the effect of fee cap rate on profitability suggest that fee caps may reduce payday
loan prices at the cost of fewer firms. Also, estimates of the MaxLoan effect on
profit are negligible and suggest that differences in profitability in markets with
and without max loan limits are insignificant.
The estimated market sizes needed to support a monopoly, duopoly, and
70
oligopoly, namely Y1 to Y5 are reported in the first section of Table 5. The num-
bered column headings in Table V relate to the specifications reported in Table 4.
As outlined in previous sections, the break-even market size, or entry threshold,
for a given market structure is calculated by setting the appropriate expected profit
function equal to zero. In each condition, entry thresholds were computed with all
the covariates taken at their sample means. The computations imply that a county
with a population of 22,000, or aggregate income of 800 million, is required to
support a monopolist. A population of approximately 33,000, or a total income
of around 1.25 billion, is needed to support a duopolist. After the duopolist, new
lender entrants require about ten thousand more people or nearly 300 million in in-
come. Hypothesis tests reveal that these entry threshold estimates are statistically
different from each other at the 99 percent confidence level.
As discussed in previous sections, per lender entry thresholds can reveal the
nature of how competition functions within the market. The second section of Ta-
ble 5 presents the calculated ratio of per lender entry thresholds, where yN = YNN .
To reiterate, in an oligopolistic market, per lender entry thresholds ratio begin-
ning above one and converging to one imply that lenders require exponentially
larger market sizes as competition reduces variable profits exponentially. How-
ever, calculated per lender entry threshold ratios reveal the opposite effect; the
duopolist and oligopolist require a smaller market size than the monopolist to
enter. A duopolist requires a market size nearly 25 percent smaller than a mo-
nopolist and an oligopolist tends to require a market size five percent smaller than
the duopolist. Also, hypothesis tests at the 99 percent confidence interval reject
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the null that the estimated per lender entry threshold ratios are greater than one
for each market structure and specification. These results show that entry has an
insignificant economic effect on payday lending profit.
To reiterate the rates at which fee caps are binding are found by setting the
profits of lenders in markets with caps to the profits of lenders in markets without
caps. The reported estimates of FeeCap effects on payday lending profitability
yield some intriguing results. First, fee caps reduce payday lenders profits below
a value of approximately 556 percent.13 This value is in the neighborhood of the
average fee rates charged in states without fee caps. For example, the average fee
rate in Texas, Nevada, and Idaho are 454, 521, and 582 percent.14 Fee caps below
this rate are likely to be binding and caps above it are expected to be non-binding.
Second, firms operating in markets with non-binding fee caps earn higher
profits than in markets without fee caps. For example, after controlling for lo-
cal demand and cost characteristics, a fee caps rate of 780 percent, which is also
the cap in Louisiana, results in 7.14 percent more payday lenders than in markets
without fee caps. This finding suggests that entry is economically greater in mar-
kets with non-binding fee caps, implying that profit margins are larger in markets
with non-binding fee caps and evidence of tacit collusion at focal points in the
industry.
13The 90 percent confidence interval of values which result in a binding fee cap is between 424
and 689 percent.
14See Pew Charitable Trusts (2013).
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2.6.1 Non-binding fee caps as focal points for tacit collusion
In order to further test the question if focal points lead to higher profit margins
for payday lenders, and thus evidence of tacit collusion at focal points, this study
calculates entry thresholds and threshold ratios for lenders in markets without fee
caps and with binding and non-binding fee caps. To identify these effects, the
sample is split into three groups using the fee cap value previously identified:
markets without fee caps and with binding non-binding fee caps. A market at and
above a fee cap of 520 percent is a non-binding fee cap market and a market below
the cap is a binding fee cap market. Next, three models were estimated similar to
the specification described in column 2 of Table 2.15 Finally, the entry thresholds
and threshold ratios were calculated from the estimates.
Figure 3 displays the mean entry thresholds and their 95 percent confi-
dence interval for markets without fee caps and with binding and non-binding fee
caps. For each given fee cap regime in Figure 3, the confidence intervals for every
market structure show that entry thresholds are statistically different. In a given
market structure, the differences in entry thresholds for a lender in a market with-
out fee caps and with non-binding fee caps are statistically significant, except for
market structures at and above four payday lenders. Also, the differences in entry
thresholds for lenders in markets with non-binding fee caps and without fee caps
are statistically different.
The results suggest that all else equal, profit margins are higher in markets
15The other specifications were tried, and the results were similar.
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with non-binding fee caps than markets with different fee cap regimes. The mean
estimated entry thresholds are 29 percent smaller for lenders in markets with non-
binding fee caps compared to lenders in markets without fee caps. Evidence of
lower entry thresholds in markets with non-binding fee caps relative to markets
without fee caps is consistent with the notion that payday lenders earn higher
profit margins in markets with focal points. Since higher profit margins in markets
with focal points suggest tacit collusion, the results indicate that non-binding fee
caps facilitate tacit collusion in payday lending markets. Moreover, because tacit
collusion at a focal point in a market is tantamount to the presence of market
power, market power may allow payday lenders to engage in anti-competitive
behavior.
Intuitively, binding price ceilings result in lower profit margins for firms.
Entry thresholds of payday lenders displayed in Figure 3 reveal that the average
binding fee cap in the sample has an economic effect on entry and profits. Binding
fee caps appear to put pressure on payday lenders entry decisions and operations.
On average, in order for a payday lender to enter a market with binding fee caps,
they must have 4,000 more consumers than the average market without fee caps.
Although binding fee caps may reduce profits, the results do not show that bind-
ing fee caps reduce payday loan prices for consumers. Payday lenders may pass
through the costs of navigating around binding fee caps to consumers through ad-
ditional fees, such as a broker fee. This change may reduce the quantity demanded
of payday loans, leading to fewer stores. Nevertheless, binding fee caps seem to
put downward pressure on payday lenders’ profits.
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Although profit margins are higher in markets with non-binding price ceil-
ings; market conduct is strikingly similar across markets without fee caps and with
non-binding and binding fee caps. Figure 4 displays the estimated entry threshold
ratios and their confidence intervals. All the entry threshold ratio in each sub-
group sample model and specification are statistically less than one. Moreover,
the differences between the estimated entry threshold for each market structure
produced from each segmented sample are statistically insignificant. These en-
try threshold ratios demonstrate that the competitive effect of entry is similar in
markets without fee caps and with non-binding and binding fee caps. Since the
competitive effects of entry are identical across each type of market, there does
not appear to be a significant effect of fee caps on the competitive impact of entry.
In models of tacit collusion, collusion may break down as more firms en-
ter the market. An endogenous entry model would predict constant and non-
decreasing entry threshold ratios below one, or constant profit margins, up to some
number of firms where collusion is stable. At the market structure where coopera-
tion breaks down, entry threshold ratios would rise above one and begin to decline
towards one as the market converges to the competitive outcome. In the case of
payday lenders, it does not appear that tacit collusion breaks down even with five
payday lenders in the market. The competitive effects of entry in markets with
non-binding fee caps remain below one. Given that tacit collusion is stable even
up to five payday lenders, there may exist a mechanism in the market which gives
payday lenders market power and facilitate tacit collusion.
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2.7 Conclusion
The efficiency of the market to guide payday loan prices to a competitive outcome
is the heart of regulatory issues in the industry. In a market where many consumers
rely on payday loans to meet subsistence needs, market failures in the industry can
lead to significantly perverse outcomes. Mechanisms that allow payday lenders
to engage in higher market power would be most damaging to an economically
vulnerable part of society. The results of this study suggest payday lenders use
non-binding fee caps as focal points for tacit collusion. Payday lender entry is
more significant in markets with non-binding fee caps compared to other markets,
suggesting that profit margins are higher in these markets. Moreover, this issue
could be present in both small and large markets. A more significant level of
incumbent payday lenders does not significantly change the decisions of the next
entrant. These results demonstrate the paradoxical effects of specific regulation
intended to reduce costs for payday loan borrowers.
Although the analysis presented in this study finds evidence of tacit collu-
sion at non-binding fee caps in local payday lending markets, it did not identify
the source of market power in the industry. Potential causes of market power in
the industry include adverse selection, switching costs, and consumer irrational-
ity. Many industry observers suggest that the industry use credit reports similar to
other credit markets to solve the adverse selection problem. Indeed, these mea-
sures may lead to competitive pricing in the industry. Given the potential wel-
fare gains of achieving a competitive outcome, future research should identify the
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mechanism of market power within the industry.
Many industry observers argue that more payday lenders, and hence com-
petition, are the solution to lowering payday loan prices. However, the results of
this study suggest that, given additional incumbents do not affect the next lender’s
entry decision, increasing the number of participants will not lead to more com-
petitive pricing. Proponents of lower pricing in payday lending should focus their
attention on aspects of payday lending unrelated to the market structure when
looking to promote competition in the market.
Similar to Knittel and Stango (2003), this study’s results suggest that focal
points as facilitators of tacit collusion are a potential explanation for larger profit
margins for payday lenders in markets with non-binding fee caps. Regulators
should take care when instituting and setting the level of a fee cap. If regulators
establish a fee cap above the binding rate, consumer welfare may decline.
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Figure 2.1: Locations of payday lenders in a sample market: Oconee County,
South Carolina
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Figure 2.2: Markets in the sample
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Figure 2.3: Payday lender entry thresholds
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Figure 2.4: Payday lender entry threshold ratios
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for sample markets
Number of payday lenders
Variable Sample 0 1 2 3 4 5+
Count 1,978 1,011 279 180 130 100 268
Population mean 2.43 1.89 2.61 3.24 3.93 4.34 5.22
std. dev 2.16 1.17 1.70 1.76 1.72 2.25 2.14
Income mean 1.26 0.49 0.90 1.26 1.45 1.67 1.95
std. dev 0.92 0.54 0.73 0.91 0.82 0.99 0.95
Pov mean 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18
std. dev 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
IncomePerCap mean 3.99 4.24 3.74 3.77 3.85 3.76 3.67
std. dev 1.09 1.29 7.66 7.88 1.77 6.13 5.88
BlackPop mean 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.14
std. dev 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.18
FoodInsec mean 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17
std. dev 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Rent mean 648 623 673 677 693 676 676
std. dev 130 136 118 116 138 108 91
Feecap mean 402 353 452 432 431 387 514
std. dev 417 369 457 455 440 383 510
MaxLoan mean 1,152 1,510 778 830 541 535 501
std. dev 5,649 7,075 3,568 3,710 390 369 362
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics for sample markets by fee cap regime
Variable Sample No fee cap Non-binding fee cap Binding fee cap
Count 1,978 394 353 1,231
Number of Payday Lenders mean 1.75 1.35 2.64 1.60
std. dev 2.73 2.36 3.76 2.43
Population mean 2.43 2.03 2.27 2.55
std. dev 2.16 2.06 1.91 2.23
Income mean 1.26 0.81 0.88 0.98
std. dev 0.92 0.84 0.89 0.90
Pov mean 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.15
std. dev 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06
IncomePerCap mean 3.99 4.20 3.85 3.97
std. dev 1.09 1.34 1.35 0.93
BlackPop mean 0.07 0.04 0.18 0.05
std. dev 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.11
FoodInsec mean 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15
std. dev 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03
Rent mean 648 708 645 631
std. dev 130 158 149 111
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Table 2.4: Estimated parameters of payday lender profit function
Coefficient Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
α1 0.50∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.19) (0.22)
α2 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
α3 −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
α4 −0.05∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
α5 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
αPov 1.01∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 4.81∗∗∗ 5.71∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.31) (0.71) (0.72)
αBlackPop 0.58∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.30) (0.37)
αFoodInsec 1.50∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 5.56∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.42) (1.01) (1.26)
αIncomePerCap −0.01 −0.01 −0.14∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
γ1 1.14∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.17) (0.20) (0.05) (0.17) (0.20)
γ2 0.55∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
γ3 0.27∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27 0.34∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
γ4 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
γ5 0.20∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
γRent 0.73∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ −0.64 0.94∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.29) (0.80) (0.33)
γMaxLoan 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
γFeeCap −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
γNoMaxLoan −0.05 −0.02
(0.12) (0.12)
γNoFeeCap −0.26∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.11)
LogLik −2,291.05 −2,125.76 −2,070.67 −2,463.08 −2,140.44 −2,083.27
N = 1,978
Notes: standard deviations in parentheses. ***significant at the 1% level,
**significant at the 5% level, and at the *significant at the 10% level
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Table 2.5: Estimated parameters of payday lender profit function
Coefficient Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
α1 0.50∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.19) (0.22)
α2 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
α3 −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
α4 −0.05∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
α5 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
αPov 1.01∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 4.81∗∗∗ 5.71∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.31) (0.71) (0.72)
αBlackPop 0.58∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.30) (0.37)
αFoodInsec 1.50∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 5.56∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.42) (1.01) (1.26)
αIncomePerCap −0.01 −0.01 −0.14∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
γ1 1.14∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.17) (0.20) (0.05) (0.17) (0.20)
γ2 0.55∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
γ3 0.27∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27 0.34∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
γ4 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
γ5 0.20∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
γRent 0.73∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ −0.64 0.94∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.29) (0.80) (0.33)
γMaxLoan 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
γFeeCap −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
γNoMaxLoan −0.05 −0.02
(0.12) (0.12)
γNoFeeCap −0.26∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.11)
LogLik −2,291.05 −2,125.76 −2,070.67 −2,463.08 −2,140.44 −2,083.27
N = 1,978
Notes: standard deviations in parentheses. ***significant at the 1% level,
**significant at the 5% level, and at the *significant at the 10% level
86
Table 2.6: Market threshold estimates
Variable Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimated entry thresholds
Y1 2.27 2.20 2.19 0.90 0.81 0.81
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Y2 3.39 3.22 3.20 1.43 1.18 1.17
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Y3 4.33 4.09 4.08 1.91 1.51 1.50
(0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
Y4 5.28 4.95 4.95 2.37 1.84 1.83
(0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.02)
Y5 6.27 5.91 5.91 2.88 2.21 2.19
(0.18) (0.18) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.03)
Estimated per lender entry threshold ratios
y2
y1
0.74 0.73 0.72 0.80 0.73 0.72
(0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
y3
y2
0.86 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.85 0.85
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
y4
y3
0.92 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.93
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
y5
y4
0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.98
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06)
N = 1,978
Notes: standard deviations in parentheses.
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CHAPTER 3
DO INTEREST RATE SWAPS AFFECT MORTGAGE LENDING?
EVIDENCE FROM THE US CREDIT UNION INDUSTRY
3.1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, traditional financial intermediaries have gathered a significant
stake in the interest rate derivative market, as the notional amount of all interest
rate contracts in the US banking industry reached $1.3 quadrillion at the end of
2017 (FDIC, 2017). As interest rate derivatives help financial intermediaries mit-
igate interest rate risk, they may have profound implications for lending decisions
by financial institutions.
A derivative is an independent contract, agreed upon between two parties,
that specifies, based on the condition of an asset or liability, when payments are
to be made between the parties. The largest component of the global derivative
market, representing roughly 52.4% of the global market in 2017, are interest rate
swaps (Bank for International Settlements, 2017). A vanilla interest rate swap
is a contract between two parties that allows one party to exchange a fixed-rate
payment obligation for a floating-rate one, typically the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR). For financial intermediaries that are end users of swaps, interest
rate swaps allow buyers to insure against the re-pricing risk that arises from rate
mismatches between assets and liabilities. This mismatch is typically a results of
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financial intermediaries using short term shares (such as deposits) to fund long
term loans and investments.
The impact of interest rate derivatives on the supply of credit has been widely
discussed and acknowledged in the literature. Since the advent of interest rate
derivatives in the financial intermediary markets, they have consistently been in
the spot light of financial regulators, as interest rate derivatives may have a pro-
found effect on lending decisions and risk held by financial intermediaries. On one
hand, interest rate derivatives can lead to a transfer of risk from financial interme-
diaries to other firms in the financial market, leading to reduced costs in lending
and, perhaps, an expansion in the supply of credit. On the other hand, interest rate
derivatives could be used by financial intermediaries to attempt to earn greater rev-
enue through speculation, resulting in increased risk. Since the US government
insures deposit accounts up to $250,000 for most domestic financial intermedi-
aries, a decision by a financial intermediary that results in a greater probability of
insolvency could have significant impact on federal government expenditures.
In this paper, I test how access to interest rate swaps affects financial interme-
diaries lending decisions. In particular, I examine how the use of interest rate
swaps impacts growth in fixed-rate and variable-rate mortgage lending by US
credit unions. Although this question has been addressed in the literature (e.g.,
Brewer et al. 2000), to the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to iden-
tify this effect using a difference-in-differences approach, in which I exploit a rule
change as a source of variation, as opposed to using balance sheet items as in-
strumental variables. Since the use of interest rate swaps and lending decisions
89
are endogenous, an econometric technique that ensures a causal effect is neces-
sary to establish proper identification. To the best of my knowledge, my study is
the first to identify the effects without relying on the assumption of the exclusion
restriction that comes with instrumental variables.
In 2014, as part of the National Credit Union Association’s (NCUA) strategy
for helping credit unions manage interest-rate risk, credit unions with assets over
$250 million were allowed limited access to financial derivatives, which includes
interest rate swaps, interest rate caps, interest rate floors, basis swaps, and Trea-
sury futures. By the fourth quarter of 2017, 18 credit unions held interest-rate
swaps with a notional value of $3.6 billion. A feature of the NCUA’s regulation
and policy of credit unions is that they cannot deal interest rate swaps to other
financial intermediaries. This aspect is ideal for this study, since I do not have
to consider entities that take the fixed-rate position on a interest rate swap, which
may occur in the banking industry, in my sample.
My sample represents all NCUA-insured credit unions with total assets greater
than $250 million as of January 2011 that hold mortgage loans in their portfolio.
Using this sample, I create models that explain growth rates in total, fixed-rate,
and variable-rate mortgage loans that include a measure of a credit union’s use
of interest rate swaps. I find a statistically significant and positive relationship
between total and fixed-rate mortgage loan growth and the use of interest rate
swaps for US credit unions. Credit unions that use interest rate swaps experience
roughly 0.5 percent points greater mortgage loan growth than credit unions that
do not use them. However, I find a statistically insignificant relationship between
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variable-rate mortgage loan growth and use of interest rate swaps.
The positive correlation between interest rate swap use and mortgage loan
growth is consistent with the notion that derivatives markets allow financial inter-
mediaries to increase lending at a larger rate than without them. In particular, my
results suggest that the use of interest rate swaps allows intermediaries the ability
to hedge against the risk associated with making a loan with a fixed-rate return.
However, it is also possible that other factors that specifically affect credit unions
that would choose to use interest rate swaps that occur around the time that the
rule change went into effect, thus introducing bias to my estimates. To account
for this, I use a matching procedure to pair my treatment credit unions, those that
use interest rate swaps, with select control credit unions, those that do not use
interest rate swaps, that have similar financial characteristics to the treated group.
My main results remain when I use a matched sample.
In general, my results suggest that mortgage lending of US credit unions that
use interest rate swaps experience greater growth, particularly in fixed-rate loans,
than credit unions that do not use swaps. Thus, regulations that restrict the use
of interest rate swaps may result in decreased lending growth. Since fixed-rate
mortgage loans are popular in the US, these regulations may have a profound
effect on domestic housing markets.
3.2 Institutional background
Before describing my sample and empirical methodology, I explain the interest
rate risk associated with fixed rate mortgages, and present vital institutional details
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regarding US credit unions and the NCUA’s policy on financial derivatives, which
is the basis of my identification strategy.
3.2.1 Risks associated with mortgage lending
In the US, the interest rate on a first mortgage real estate loans is typically set
at a fixed- or variable-rate . A fixed-rate mortgage in the US is a mortgage with
fixed nominal monthly payments over the term of the loan, typically 30 years. A
variable-rate mortgage, also known as an adjustable rate mortgage, is a mortgage
that involves a period of fixed-rate monthly payments that transitions to a floating-
rate payment that is subject to change, typically in response to changes in interest
rates. When a change occurs, the monthly payment is “adjusted” to reflect the
new interest rate. Over the last few decades, U.S. borrowers have increasingly
favored fixed-rate mortgages over variable-rate mortgages (Aragon et al., 2010).
At the end of 2018, the market share for variable-rate mortgages was roughly four
percent of all mortgages sold (Ellie Mae, 2018).
Interest rate risk is risk that arises when the absolute level of interest rates
change. Fixed-income securities are particularly susceptible to interest rate risk.
As a fixed-rate mortgage is a type of fixed-income security, it is significantly more
susceptible to interest rate risk than a variable-rate mortgage. In addition, mort-
gage lenders are particularly susceptible, since lenders’ short-term funding costs,
such as deposits and short-term wholesale financing, are susceptible to interest
rate changes. Mismatches in fixed revenue stream and floating short-term funding
costs have serious implications for a lenders financial health, as holding a signif-
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icant amount of fixed-rate mortgage in their portfolio will expose the lender to
losses in a rising interest rate setting. This mismatch was a significant cause of
US savings and loan failures during the early 1980s (White, 1991).
Another form of risk related to interest rates and mortgage loans is prepayment
risk. Prepayment risk is the risk of borrowers refinancing mortgage loans when
interest rates fall. Prepayment risk affects fixed-rate mortgage as mortgage bor-
rowers with fixed-rates made prior to a decline in interest rates are more likely to
refinance to a lower rate after a decline in interest rates. Unlike interest rate risk,
the relationship between interest rates and prepayments is less direct as housing
turnover and credit conditions also affect the intensity of prepayments. These
combination of factors makes it intractable to hedge prepayment risk. Gabaix,
Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007) find evidence that holding nondiversifiable
prepayment risk is expensive and requires a positive premium.
In an ideal world, with frictionless capital markets imagined in Modigliani and
Miller (1958), mortgage lenders would be indifferent to holding these risks, as the
value of an unhedged mortgage loan is equal to the value of a hedged mortgage
loan. However, corporate finance research assets that bearing undiversified risk is
costly due to the presence of financing frictions (e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985); and
Froot et al. (1993)).
Mortgage lenders typically deal with interest rate risk in two ways. First,
lenders can reduce interest rate risk from its portfolio by selling fixed-rate mort-
gages on the secondary mortgage market, typically to government sponsored en-
tities (GSE) such as Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)
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and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), allowing lenders
to reduce interest rate risk and expand fixed-rate mortgage lending in the market
(Vickery and Fuster, 2014). However, a GSE will not purchase mortgage loans for
single-family homes with values that exceed $484,350, or $726,525 for high-cost
areas. Mortgage loans that exceed this value are known as “jumbo loans”. Lenders
can only sell to non-agency buyers, which tend to be less liquid than GSEs, on sec-
ondary markets. When non-agency buyers are illiquid, mortgage lenders tend to
make fewer fixed-rate jumbo loans, suggesting that mortgage lenders are reluctant
to retain the prepayment and interest rate risk associated with fixed-rate mortgages
(Vickery and Fuster, 2014).
Second, mortgage lenders can hedge against interest rate risk by obtaining in-
terest rate derivatives, such as interest rate swaps. In terms of notional value, inter-
est rate swaps hold the largest share in the global over-the-counter (OTC) market,
representing roughly 52.4 percent in total notional value of all contracts sold in
2017 (BIS, 2017). An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to
exchange a stream if interest payments without exchanging the underlying debt.
In a vanilla interest rate swap, one party exchanges a fixed interest payment on a
notional principle to another party for a floating interest payment, typically the LI-
BOR rate. The economic rationale for interest rate swaps is based on the principle
of comparative advantage (Bicksler and Chen, 1986). In Diamond’s (1984) model
of financial intermediation with risk aversion, diversification increases the inter-
mediary’s risk tolerance toward each loan, allowing the risk bearing necessary for
incentive purposes to be less costly. Hence, using Diamond’s approach, interest
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rate swaps reduce the cost associated with interest rate risk on holding fixed-rate
mortgages, resulting in mortgage lenders having a greater tolerance for holding
fixed-rate mortgages. In the banking literature, studies have found that financial
institutions that use interest rate derivatives tend to experience greater overall loan
growth than institutions that do not (e.g., Brewer et al. 1999; Brewer et al. 2014).
3.2.2 The US credit union industry
A credit union is a mutual organization that provides deposit, lending, and other
services to a membership defined by an common bond. Profits are re-payed to
members through reinvestment in the credit union, dividends, or lower interest
rates on loans (Bauer, 2007). At the end of 2017, there were 5,573 credit unions
in the US, with a membership base of 111.3 million and total asset size of $1.38
trillion, roughly 8.3 percent of total assets held by US commercial banks.
Credit unions offer financial products to members defined by a common bond.
For credit unions, a common bond could be a shared employer, shared geography,
or other organizational affiliation such as a religious institution. The original de-
sign of the common bond was to allow members to substitute their shared knowl-
edge of each others’ creditworthiness for collateral. Historically, this common
bond status allowed credit unions to make low risk, and thus at a reduced interest
rate, small-value, uncollateralized loans (Walter, 2006).
The creation of nationwide credit bureaus, which provides information on the
creditworthiness of most borrowers, and the rise of credit card lending as well
as loan products that allow borrowers to affordably use real estate collateral for
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small loans, such as a home equity line of credit (HELOC), led to a less important
need for small value loans from credit unions. In the presence of new competition,
credit unions were forced to change from their original structure. As a result the
credit union industry transitioned to offering primarily small value loans, such as
automobile loans, to mortgage and, to a lesser extent, toward commercial lending.
After passage of the Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998, credit
unions were allowed to constitute a membership base with multiple common
bonds. This policy has facilitated the growth of the average asset size of credit
unions through mergers and acquisitions. While the number of credit unions de-
clined from 10,628 in 1999 to 5,573 in 2017, the average credit union size in-
creased more than sixfold over this period, from $39 million in 1999 to $250
million in 2017.
Since the early 1990’s, credit unions’ market share of residential real estate
loans has risen (Disalvo and Johnston, 2017). As credit unions’ share of the mort-
gage market rises, mortgage loans became a greater share of their total loans, as
the proportion of mortgage loans to assets grew from 25.3 percent at the end of
2000 to 40.7 percent at the end of 2017 (NCUA 2000, 2017). Similar to other
US mortgage lenders, the average US credit union’s mortgage portfolio is mostly
composed of fixed-rate mortgages as they represented 71.3 percent of mortgage
loans at the end of 2017 (NCUA, 2017).
As mentioned in the previous section, fixed rate mortgages present interest rate
risk for mortgage lenders. Since interest rate sensitive non-core deposits make up
a significant portion of credit unions deposit share — interest rate sensitive de-
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posits such as money market shares, share certificates, and non-member deposits
represented 38.2 percent of total credit union deposits at the end of 2017 — the
mismatch between fixed income earning assets and variable priced liabilities exist
in the credit union industry. When interest rates rise, credit unions’ investments
may suffer losses on their investments.
Figure 1 shows the total quarterly accumulated unrealized gains or losses on
available for sale securities for the credit industry and the quarterly 30 month
LIBOR rate from 2003 to 2013. When the LIBOR rate was relatively high from
2004 to 2008, credit unions experienced losses on their investments. Recently, the
asset-liability mismatch has caused concern among US regulators.1
Traditionally, the primary method credit unions use to mitigate interest rate
risk is to offload fixed-rate loans. Regulators often encouraged credit unions to re-
move mortgage loans from their balance sheet.2 As long-term interest rates plum-
meted in 2009 and again in 2011, credit unions found it increasingly important to
sell fixed-rate mortgages to avoid locking in low earning assets for the long term.
As a result, the share of loans sold almost doubled, to an average of 52 percent
from 2009 to 2012, and as much as 58 percent in the first quarter of 2013 (United
States. Cong. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 2013).
Figure 2 shows the relationship of credit unions’ sales of secondary mortgages
1“Interest rates have recently started to rise. A rapid rise would rock the foundation of many
credit unions’ balance sheets. Thousands of credit unions would earn realize negative earning.”
Debbie Matz, former NCUA chairman (2013)
2”Real estate loans have come to comprise large parts of credit union balance sheets. Our con-
cern is that as you put more fixed-rate assets on the books, it raises the bar on risk management.”
John Worth, former Chief Economist of the NCUA (2015)
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and interest rates. From 2004 to 2008, credit unions sold a smaller proportion of
their new mortgage loans than in the period of low interest rates, from 2008 to
2012, suggesting that credit unions are less willing to hold on to assets with fixed
low rates.
On March 3, 2014, the NCUA Boards final derivatives rule went into effect
and allowed federal credit unions to apply to use derivatives to reduce interest
rate risk. Under the regulation, federal credit unions with assets of at least $250
million and a composite CAMEL rating of 1, 2, or 3 were allowed to apply to
use derivatives. Approved federal credit unions have limited authority to invest in
simple interest rate derivatives for balance sheet management and risk reduction,
including interest rate swaps, interest rate caps, interest rate floors, basis swaps,
and Treasury futures. At the end of 2017, 18 federally insured credit unions held
interest rate swaps with a total notional value of $3.6 billion, representing roughly
40 percent of all derivatives held by US credit unions (NCUA, 2017).
3.3 Methodology
There are three major issues to consider when isolating and studying the causal
effect of interest rate swap usage on lending decisions. First, an event that induces
credit unions to use interest rate swaps to expand mortgage lending must be iden-
tified. Second, operational differences across credit unions must be controlled for.
Third, differences in portfolio choice between credit unions that use and do not
use interest rate swaps must be accounted for so that the causal effect of swap
usage on lending decisions can be distinguished from other differences between
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these two types of credit unions.
The usage of interest rate swaps may be related to organizational factors that
are correlated to lending decisions. Purnanandam (2007) finds that commercial
banks with higher probability of financial distress manage their interest rate risk
more aggressively with off-balance instruments. Credit unions that engage in sig-
nificant mortgage lending may use interest rate swaps to avoid insolvency rather
than to grow their lending activity. Hence, the endogeneity between the use of in-
terest rate swaps and lending decisions may result in biased OLS estimators from
a model of financial intermediation.
To identify the effect of interest rate swap use on loan growth, econometrician
use an instrumental variables approach, where balance sheet items instrument for
the propensity to use interest rate swaps. For example, Brewer et al. (2000) uses
the log of bank assets, net-interest margin, a binary variable indicating whether
the bank was a derivatives dealer, the capital-to-asset ratio, and the concentration
ratio for each bank’s primary market area as instrumental variables. The issue of
this approach is that these variables likely directly, and not indirectly through use
of interest rate swaps, influence lending decisions, thus violating the exclusion
restriction.
Prior to March 3, 2014, US credit unions were not allowed access or usage
of interest rate derivatives. During this time, credit unions that held significant
amounts of mortgage loans in their portfolio may have desired access to interest
rate swaps, but were not permitted access by the regulation of the time. Also,
credit unions may have desired access to interest rate swaps in order to expand
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mortgage lending without incurring additional interest rate risk. In either case, the
variation in the use of interest rate swaps before and after the rule change comes
from the rule change itself. Hence, I can compare credit unions that use interest
rate swaps with credit unions that do not and credit unions that were prevented
from using them prior to the rule change. In other words, I can use the rule change
to examine a treatment group (credit unions that use interest rate swaps) and a
control group (credit unions that do not use interest rate swaps) in a difference-in-
differences context.
In addition, I use a panel dataset of US credit unions from 2010 to 2017.
By using a panel dataset, I can include firm and time fixed effects in the main
specification. Firm fixed effects prevents assigning a false significance to a time-
invariant credit union-specific factor, such as use of interest rate or asset size, due
to an omitted variable. The time dimension also allows for the control of credit
union-wide factors, such as macroeconomic factors, that change over time.
Difference-in-differences methods provide unbiased effect estimates if the trend
over time would have been constant between the treatment and control groups in
the absence of the policy. However, a concern with difference-in-differences mod-
els is that the treatment and control groups may contrast in way that would affect
their trends over time. Credit unions that chose to use interest rate swaps after the
policy change may have fundamental differences with those that do not. Other
policies and market trends that occurred after the policy change may impact credit
unions that use interest rate swaps differently than those that do not, violating the
constant trend assumption.
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Propensity score methods are typically used to deal with this type of con-
founding in difference-in-differences studies. Propensity score matching works
by linking treatment to control observation with the same observed characteris-
tics. Ideally, the only difference between the matching observations is the treat-
ment status. Hence, I conduct a semi-parametric matching procedure developed
by Ho et al. (2007) to match treatment and control credit unions by their balance
sheet characteristics from Q1 2011.
3.4 Sample description and data source
The sample of credit unions includes NCUA-insured credit unions with total assets
greater than $250 million. Of these entities, I remove credit unions that do not
hold real estate loans. My sample starts with 721 credit unions in January 2011
and ends with 834 in December 2017. To avoid any possible selection bias, I
include all credit unions with assets greater than $250 million that merged or were
acquired from 2011 to 2017 in the sample. Balance sheet and off-balance sheet
data come from the NCUA’s Call Report Quarterly Data. I define mortgage loans
to be all first mortgage real estate loans held on a credit unions balance sheet at
the end of a given quarter.
Figure 3 shows the total notional value of interest rate swaps held by US credit
unions and the total number of credit unions that use interest rate swaps from 2013
to 2017. Note that eight credit unions immediately began using interest rate swaps
in Q4 2013 after the NCUA amended it’s derivative policy.
Table 1 presents sample statistics for selected balance sheet items at the end of
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2017. Selected balance sheet items include book value of assets, total mortgage
loan growth, fixed rate mortgage loan growth, variable rate mortgage loan growth,
the ratio of real estate loans to total assets, the ratio of deposits to assets, non-
performing mortgage loans to assets, and the capital asset ratio. Growth variables
are the difference between current and previous quarter book value of a type of
loan on a credit unions balance sheet normalized by the previous quarter’s total
assets. The capital asset ratio, also known as the net worth ratio in the credit union
industry, is the ratio of regular reserves and undivided earnings to total assets.
Federal regulation stipulates that a credit union with a 6 percent net worth ratio is
“adequately” capitalized.
Table 1 reveals some interesting differences between credit unions that use and
do not use interest rate swaps. In terms of the book value of assets, credit unions
that use interest rates swaps are about twelve times as large as credit unions that
do not. These differences are statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
A similar pattern exists with regard to the ratio of real estate loans to total as-
sets. The ratio of real estate loans to total assets for credit unions that use interest
rate swaps are roughly twenty percentage points greater than those that do not.
These differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Discovering
that credit unions that use interest rate swaps hold proportionally more real estate
loans is an unsurprising result. Since mortgage loans hold more interest rate risk
than consumer loans, such as automobile loans, it is reasonable to find that credit
unions that hold interest rate swaps hold relatively more mortgage loans on av-
erage. However, it is still unclear if holding interest rate swaps motivates credit
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unions to make relatively more mortgage loans, as credit unions that hold more
mortgage loans may prefer to use interest rate swaps to mitigate their interest rate
risk.
There is no statistically significant differences between the capital asset ratio
and the non-performing mortgage loans to assets ratio held be credit unions that
use and do not use interest rate swaps.
Figure 4 shows fixed-rate mortgage loan growth from 2011 to 2017 for credit
unions that use and do not use interest rate swaps. The graph demonstrates that
after the rule change went into effect, credit unions that use interest rate swaps
experienced greater growth in fixed-rate mortgages than credit unions that do not.
Figure 5 shows growth in variable-rate mortgage loans from 2011 to 2017. The
graph reveals no discernible difference in variable-rate mortgage loan growth be-
tween credit unions that use and do not use interest rate swaps.
3.5 Regression analysis
As mentioned in the methodology section, the analysis compares changes in mort-
gage lending decisions of credit unions that use and do not use interest rate swaps
after the NCUA changed it’s derivative policy on March 3rd, 2013.
One characteristics that complicates the econometrics of the analysis is that
mortgage loans in a given quarter will impact the credit union-specific factors of
future quarters. In other words, the dependent variable for a given quarter will
be correlated with the credit union-specific control variables for future quarters.
For example, loans are entered on balance sheets as part of bank assets, the typ-
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ical measure of credit union size. Thus, when credit union size is controlled for
by credit union assets, this measure includes loans that were issued in previous
quarter but had a maturity beyond a year. Furthermore, credit unions are likely to
adjust their current lending behavior conditional on their past funding levels. To
account for the correlation of previous quarter’s financial characteristics on current
quarter’s lending decisions, I assume the model for mortgage lending behavior by
credit unions i in time t is
yit = βxit−1 +λ1PostRuleChange×UsesInterestRateSwaps+ θt +αi + it
(3.1)
.
Where yit is the change in mortgage loans relative to the previous quarters as-
sets; xit−1 is a vector of financial characteristics; PostRuleChange is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the time is after the NCUA rule change;
UsesInterestRateSwaps is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
credit union uses interest rate swaps; θt is a time fixed effect; αi is a credit union
fixed effect; and it is an idiosyncratic error term assumed to be drawn from the
normal distribution.
The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the credit union level to
prevent possible bias in the standard errors while giving errors robust to credit
union-level autocorrelation.
Primary regressions use the unmatched sample, which tracks all credit unions
that hold assets with book value greater than $250 million from 2011 to 2017 or
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until their exit from the sample, and are shown in Table 2. All dependent variables
are a credit union’s difference in loans made in the current and previous quarter
normalized by the previous quarter’s assets. In Table 2, the first dependent variable
located in the second column is all mortgage loans, the third column is fixed-rate
mortgage loans, and the third column is variable-rate mortgage loans.
All the regressions include as explanatory variables the natural log of asset size
in USD, the natural log of asset size in USD squared, the ratio of mortgage loans
to assets, the ratio of deposits to assets, the ratio of non-performing mortgage
loans to assets, and the capital asset ratio. These variables are from the previous
quarter and assumed to be sequentially exogenous. Other variables are assumed
to be exogenous and are as of the current quarter.
For the second column, the coefficient for the effect of interest rate swap use on
all mortgage loan growth is positive and statistically significant; on average credit
unions that use swaps experience roughly 0.4 percentage points greater mortgage
loan growth than credit unions that do not use them. This result if the first confir-
mation that use of interest rate swaps leads to greater loan growth.
Statistically significant covariates in column 2 include the ratio of mortgage
loans to assets, the ratio of non-performing mortgage loans to asset, and the capital
asset ratio. Note that the impact of the capital asset ratio and deposits to assets
on lending growth is positive and the effect of the ratio of mortgage loans to
assets and the ratio of non-performing loans to assets is negative. These estimates
indicate that credit unions in better financial condition have larger mortgage loan
growth and that credit unions that hold significant mortgage loans on their balance
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sheet tend to have less significant growth in mortgage lending.
Estimates shown in the third column reveal that the use of interest rate swaps
has a positive and statistically significant effect on the growth of fixed-rate mort-
gage loans. This estimate is slightly larger and more statistically significant than
for all mortgage loans. Estimates shown in the fourth column reveal that the effect
of use of interest rate swaps on variable-rate mortgage loan growth is statistically
insignificant. As expected, the results demonstrate that interest rate swaps have
a detectable impact on fixed-loan mortgage loan growth, but not on variable-loan
growth, consistent with the notion that interest rate swaps encourage financial in-
stitutions to make more fixed-rate loans by reducing interest rate risk on assets
with fixed-rate returns.
Using the matching procedure discussed earlier, I match treatment and con-
trol credit unions based on asset size, the ratio of mortgage loans to assets, the
ratio of deposits to assets, the ratio of non-performing mortgage loans to assets,
and the capital asset ratio one quarter prior to the policy change, in Q1 2014. Ta-
ble 3 shows the summary statistics for the matched treatment and control credit
unions. Notice that the difference in means of the financial characteristics are now
statistically insignificant.
Table 4 displays the estimates of the parameters of the loan growth model us-
ing credit unions belonging to the matched sample from 2011 to 2017. Similar to
the previous estimates from Table 2, the effect of using interest rate swaps on total
mortgage loan and fixed-rate loan growth is positive and statistically significant,
with similar magnitudes.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence about the influence of interest rate swaps
on mortgage lending decisions by US credit unions. The paper focuses on the dif-
ferences in lending decisions across fixed-rate and variable-rate loans. By com-
paring the different effects of interest rate swaps on mortgage loans with different
rate structure, the analysis isolates the impact of swaps on assets with fixed and
variable-rate returns. In addition, I exploit a policy change in the US credit union
industry that impacts the use of interest rate swaps to identify the effect of swap
usage on lending decisions. The results show that after a credit unions starts using
interest rate swaps after the policy change, it’s fixed-rate mortgage loan growth
increases without a change in variable-rate growth. In total, the use of interest rate
swaps leads to more total mortgage lending growth by a credit union. Further-
more, these results are robust after estimating the model with matching treatment
and control credit unions.
As found in Brewer et al. (2000), I find that the use of interest rate swaps
leads to greater loan growth, consistent with Diamond’s (1984) theoretical predic-
tion that hedging allows financial institutions to focus on their role as delegated
monitors. My results suggest that policies that interfere or reduce financial insti-
tutions’ access to interest rate swaps will reduce growth in fixed-rate loans. Given
the popularity of fixed-rate mortgages in the United States, these policies may
have significant impacts on the US housing market.
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Figure 3.1: The quarterly return on credit unions’ investments and interest rates
from Q1 2003 to Q4 2013
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Figure 3.2: The share of all first mortgage loans which have been sold in the
secondary market to all mortgages made year-to-date from Q1 2003 to Q4 2013
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Figure 3.3: Total notional value of interest rate swaps and total number of interest
rate swap users in the US credit union industry from Q4 2014 to Q4 2017
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Figure 3.4: Fixed-rate mortgage loan growth for US credit unions from 2011 to
2017
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Figure 3.5: Variable-rate mortgage loan growth for US credit unions from 2011 to
2017
112
Table 3.1: Sample statistics for credit unions with asset sizes greater than $250
million (Q4 2017)
Uses Interest Rate Swaps Control
n 15 819
Asset size (in $B) mean 12.2 1.15
sd 22.7 1.85
max 90.6 3.73
min 0.6 0.2
Total mortgage growth mean 0.021 0.005
sd 0.041 0.011
max 0.160 0.083
min −0.017 −0.059
Fixed-rate mortgage growth mean 0.017 0.003
sd 0.039 0.008
max 0.157 0.078
min −0.011 −0.048
Variable-rate mortgage growth mean 0.002 0.001
sd 0.011 0.010
max 0.038 0.131
min −0.011 −0.206
Mortgage loans / assets mean 0.411 0.265
sd 0.127 0.128
max 0.712 0.699
min 0.057 0.000
Deposits / assets mean 0.818 0.856
sd 0.059 0.049
max 0.881 0.985
min 0.679 0.533
Non-performing real estate loans / assets mean 0.006 0.006
sd 0.006 0.008
max 0.023 0.127
min 0.000 0.000
Capital asset ratio mean 0.086 0.099
sd 0.028 0.032
max 0.117 0.389
min 0.005 −0.051
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Table 3.3: Balancing Effect of the Matching Approach for Interest-Rate Swap
Users
Uses Interest Rate Swaps Control
n 15 15
Asset Size (log)t−1 mean 22.2 21.8
sd 0.98 1.2
Mortgage loans / assetst−1 mean 0.337 0.361
sd 0.166 0.142
Deposits / assetst−1 mean 0.801 0.801
sd 0.084 0.123
Non-performing mortgage loans / assetst−1 mean 0.016 0.019
sd 0.019 0.020
Capital asset ratiot−1 mean 0.091 0.104
sd 0.037 0.091
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